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NONCOMPETES AS TAX EVASION 
REBECCA N. MORROW* 
ABSTRACT 
Al Capone famously boasted of his criminal empire: “Some call it 
bootlegging. Some call it racketeering. I call it a business.” Treasury Agent 
Frank Wilson and Prosecutor George Johnson put Capone behind bars not 
by disputing his characterization and pursuing murder or assault or RICO 
charges, but by accepting it and enforcing its tax implications. Irrespective 
of their legality, Capone’s businesses were profitable, and Capone had not 
reported their profits for tax purposes. A simple application of bedrock tax 
law achieved what other legal routes failed to achieve and sent Capone to 
Alcatraz. The trick was to see the tax argument.  
Policymakers should use a similar approach to curtail the excessive, 
exploitative, and anticompetitive use of employment noncompete 
agreements. Currently, nearly one in five (or thirty million) American 
workers is bound by an employment noncompete. Employers claim that they 
adequately compensate employees for noncompete restrictions with higher 
wages, bigger raises, and/or more generous bonuses. Policymakers scoff at 
this claim and use contract law to attack them. Unfortunately, employment 
noncompetes are like Al Capone in that they have flourished despite the 
law’s efforts to restrain them. Recently, the largest study of noncompetes in 
U.S. history paradoxically found that their prevalence is unaffected by their 
enforceability. In states like California that refuse to enforce employment 
noncompetes, they are as common as in states that uphold them. Contract 
law has proved ill-equipped to respond to the pervasive, expanding, and 
damaging use of noncompetes.  
This Article is the first to shift the focus and to argue that employment 
noncompetes, as employers currently use them, constitute tax evasion and 
should be attacked as such. If employers pay employees for noncompetes 
through compensation, then by employers’ own account, this compensation 
is not purely an expense associated with immediate benefits; rather, it is an 
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expenditure associated with future benefits—benefits that the employer will 
enjoy years after payment. Thus, the IRS should stop allowing employers to 
fully immediately deduct the compensation they pay to employees subject to 
noncompetes and instead should require that an adequate portion of total 
compensation be allocated to the noncompete and amortized over the 
restricted period, beginning when employment ends.  
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INTRODUCTION 
An employment noncompete is a contract between an employer and 
employee by which the employee agrees not to work for a competitor or 
open a competitive business for a specified period following the termination 
of her current employment relationship.1 It restricts competition “for a 
specified period of time in a designated geographical area.”2 Often, an 
employee becomes subject to a noncompete as a condition of obtaining 
employment, continuing employment, receiving a promotion, or receiving 
a bonus.3  
Employment noncompetes are unlike and should be distinguished from 
business-sale noncompetes,4 a type of contract that is not the subject of this 
Article.5 Unlike a business-sale noncompete, which begins to run 
                                                      
1. J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: 
The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 371 n.1 (2016); see also Norman 
D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine Covenant Not to Compete 
Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 987 (2012). 
2. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1960). 
3. See Evan Starr, Norman Bishara & J.J. Prescott, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force 44 
(Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 18-013, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf 
m?abstract_id=2625714 (showing in Table 2 that 60.8% of survey respondents subject to a noncompete 
first learned about the noncompete before accepting a job offer, 29.26% learned after accepting a job 
offer, and 2.22% learned before accepting a promotion or raise). 
4. See, e.g., Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 1, at 371 n.1 (contrasting employment 
noncompetes and business sale noncompetes). 
5. Noncompete agreements that are incident to the sale of a business are less problematic than 
employment noncompetes for many reasons. For tax purposes, they are less problematic because, unlike 
employment noncompetes, they are not immediately deducted but instead amortized according to the 
rules of 26 U.S.C. § 197 (2016). For public policy purposes, they are less problematic because they 
protect interests that courts view as more legitimate and involve parties of roughly equal bargaining 
power. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 2, at 647 (“Unlike a restraint accompanying a sale of good will, an 
employee restraint is not necessary for the employer to get the full value of the thing being acquired—
in this case, the employee’s current services. The promise not to act in certain ways after terminating 
employment is something additional . . . .”); id. at 647–48 (“[T]he parties to an employee covenant are 
often of unequal bargaining power and, thus, [] there is less likelihood that the covenant was actually 
bargained for. They may find that the employee has improvidently given up his only valuable economic 
asset, specialized proficiency arising from experience or training.”); Arthur Murray Dance Studios of 
Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 703–04 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952) (distinguishing between 
noncompetes incident to the sale of a business and, more suspect, employment noncompetes); Holland 
Ins. Grp., LLC v. Senior Life Ins. Co., 766 S.E.2d 187, 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Murphree v. 
Yancey Bros. Co., 716 S.E.2d 824 (2011)) (“[R]estrictive covenants that are ancillary to employment 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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immediately, an employment noncompete does not begin to run 
immediately.6 Rather, the restricted period of an employment noncompete 
begins only upon termination of the employment relationship.7 While the 
“exact terms of [employment] covenants not to compete will vary widely . 
. . [the] unifying element is that once the employment is ended (by either 
party and under any circumstances in some cases) the employee is, in 
theory, not allowed to compete against the former employer”8 for the 
restricted period, often twelve months,9 or eighteen months,10 or twenty-
four months,11 following termination. Thus, while employment 
noncompetes typically are signed pre- or mid-employment, they limit “the 
post-employment mobility of an employee.”12  
The need to curtail employment noncompetes is great. Employment 
noncompetes have been used, and have attracted judicial and political 
skepticism, for over half a millennium.13 Recently, however, their use has 
become more common,14 causing “a near explosion in the attention being 
paid to [employment] noncompetes and their effects” by media outlets, 
policymakers, economists, and legal scholars.15 While policymakers, 
economists, and legal scholars generally acknowledge that employment 
noncompetes can encourage training and innovation by protecting 
                                                      
contracts receive strict scrutiny . . . . because it is generally true in an employer/employee relationship 
that the employee goes into a transaction such as this at a great bargaining disadvantage . . . .”). 
6. Of course, there may be other policies like anti-moonlighting policies that prevent 
competition during the period of active employment. 
7. Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 497, 504 (2016) (“Covenants not to compete are a post-employment restrictive covenant between 
an employer and an employee that prohibits the employee from going to work for a competitor or 
otherwise competing with the former employer.”) (emphasis added). 
8. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 1, at 987. 
9. See, e.g., infra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that Jimmy John’s prior employment 
noncompete agreement restrained employees for more than twelve months). 
10. See, e.g., infra note 37 (noting that Amazon’s prior employment noncompete agreement 
restrained employees for eighteen months). 
11. See, e.g., Sophie Quinton, These Days, Even Janitors Are Being Required to Sign Non-
Compete Clauses, USA TODAY (May 27, 2017, 8:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
2017/05/27/noncompete-clauses-jobs-workplace/348384001/ [https://perma.cc/44HV-PN9S] (telling 
the story of Krishna Regmi, a Bhutanese refugee resettled in Pennsylvania, who worked for nine months 
as a personal care aide for a home health care agency and then was sued by that agency when it sought 
to enforce a noncompete prohibiting him from “working as a personal care aide at another home health 
agency for two years.”). 
12. Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 1, at 371 n.1 (emphasis added); see also Bishara & 
Orozco, supra note 1, at 986–87. 
13. Blake, supra note 2, at 626 (explaining that covenants not to compete “comprise one of the 
traditional common-law ‘restraints of trade’ and present problems which have kept them before the 
courts for more than five hundred years”); id. at 631 (describing Dyer’s Case, decided in 1414, in which 
the English court declared a restraint on competition “void with no consideration of the reasonableness 
of its scope.”). 
14. Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 1, at 380 & n.41. 
15. Id. at 372; see also Bishara & Orozco, supra note 1, at 983 (“Noncompetes and their possible 
impact have received attention from a broad range of researchers.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/2
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employers from the risk that their employees will “misappropriate trade 
secrets or other legally-protected intellectual properties,” they 
overwhelmingly conclude that the harms of noncompetes far outweigh their 
potential benefits, particularly as noncompetes are currently overused.16 
Employment noncompetes are deliberately anti-competitive contracts that 
undermine important public policy goals like economic growth and 
knowledge-sharing while locking employees out of employment 
opportunities and making them susceptible to exploitation by the employers 
to whom they are bound.17 At a minimum, studies indicate that employment 
noncompete agreements are significantly overused.18  
The political will to curtail employment noncompetes is also great. 
Courts, federal policymakers, and state legislatures have attempted to limit 
the harms caused by employment noncompetes by advocating and, in 
various jurisdictions, implementing resistance grounded in contract law. 
Most states will only enforce a noncompete if it is judicially determined to 
be reasonable in duration, scope, and geographic reach.19 Further, most 
states have sought to protect employees with a variety of additional 
procedural and substantive safeguards.20 California and North Dakota have 
gone so far as to prohibit judicial enforcement of employment noncompetes.  
Despite the need and political will to curtail employment noncompetes, 
however, courts overwhelmingly find that they are supported by adequate 
consideration. When employers are forced to defend employment 
noncompetes as valid, enforceable contracts that comply with judicially-
imposed reasonableness standards, they consistently and successfully argue 
that they adequately compensate their employees for being subject to 
noncompete restrictions through enhanced employment benefits. 
Employers have successfully argued to courts across the nation that an 
employer’s decision to hire an employee, retain an at-will employee, 
                                                      
16. See, e.g., Gilson, infra note 60; COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, infra notes 69–72; THE WHITE 
HOUSE, infra note 63; OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, infra note 27; Starr, Prescott 
& Bishara, infra note 81; LOBEL, infra note 26; Amir & Lobel, infra note 89. 
17. See infra Part I.B (detailing many harms of noncompetes). 
18. See infra Part I.A (detailing how frequently noncompetes bind employees who do not have 
access to legally-protectable information). 
19. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra Part I.C (detailing a variety of state law approaches to curtailing employment 
noncompetes). 
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promote an employee, pay a salary to an employee, award a raise to an 
employee, pay a bonus to an employee, grant stock options to an employee, 
or otherwise to provide or increase compensation to an employee constitutes 
adequate consideration provided by the employer to the employee in 
exchange for the noncompete. These findings prevent contract law from 
being a more effective approach to curtailing employment noncompetes. 
However, as this Article aims to show, they also suggest a new—and 
potentially far more effective—approach. 
While well-intentioned and varied, efforts to curtail employment 
noncompetes through contract law have failed. Employment noncompetes 
have flourished despite contract-law-based efforts to restrain them. 
Recently, the largest study of employment noncompetes in American 
history found that, paradoxically, the prevalence of employment 
noncompetes is unaffected by their enforceability. In states like California 
that refuse to enforce noncompetes, they are as common as in states that 
uphold them. Contract law has proved ill-equipped to respond to the 
pervasive, expanding, and damaging use of noncompetes.  
This Article is the first to propose a new and potentially far more 
effective approach—a tax-law-based approach—to curtailing employment 
noncompetes. When viewed through the lens of tax law, an employment 
noncompete is not simply a contract to be challenged by the employee and 
upheld, modified, or set aside by the court. It is also an intangible asset of 
the employer, increasing that employer’s future market share and future 
business opportunities.21 According to employers’ own accounts, and the 
vast case law upholding their accounts, employers pay their employees for 
becoming subject to noncompetes through compensation. In other words, 
employers buy employment noncompetes with a portion of the 
compensation that they pay to employees subject to noncompetes.  
One innovation of this Article is to expose that, when an employer pays 
for a noncompete, it is a long-term expenditure. An employment 
noncompete is an intangible asset that primarily benefits employers in future 
tax years, beginning when the employment relationship ends. Tax law 
dictates that when a long-term expenditure is paid for with employment 
compensation, payments for long-term expenditures are not immediately 
deductible. Rather, payments for long-term expenditures must be 
                                                      
21. Blake, supra note 2, at 627 (“From the point of view of the employer, postemployment 
restraints are regarded as perhaps the only effective method of preventing unscrupulous competitors or 
employees from appropriating valuable trade information and customer relationships for their own 
benefit. Without the protection afforded by such covenants, it is argued, businessmen could not afford 
to stimulate research and improvement of business methods to a desirably high level, nor could they 
achieve the degree of freedom of communication within a company that is necessary for efficient 
operation.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/2
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capitalized.22 If a long-term expenditure has a determinable useful life, then 
the payment to acquire it is amortized ratably over its useful life.23 The 
principle that only current expenses (payments that cause benefits 
overwhelmingly within the tax year) are immediately deductible, while 
long-term expenditures (payments that cause significant benefits beyond the 
tax year) are not immediately deductible and instead must be capitalized 
and, if appropriate, amortized is bedrock tax law.24 
A further innovation of this Article is to expose that employers appear to 
be engaged in widespread violations of this bedrock principle of tax law. 
Case law indicates that, even as employers claim to compensate their 
employees for becoming subject to noncompete agreements, they do not 
allocate any portion of compensation to the noncompete agreement. Instead, 
they immediately deduct the full amount of compensation—including 
wages, raises, bonuses—that they pay to their employees as though it is 
exclusively in exchange for their employees’ current labors and not even 
partially in exchange for their employees’ agreements to be subject to a 
noncompete. In other words, they claim in contract law what they disclaim 
in tax law.  
It is stunning, given that many policymakers at federal and state levels 
have long searched for ways to curtail the use of employment noncompete 
agreements, that the IRS appears not to have challenged employers’ 
widespread violations of tax law. The IRS has not demanded that any 
portion of compensation be allocated to employment noncompetes. Nor has 
the IRS disallowed any portions of the immediate deductions that employers 
have taken for the compensation they pay to their employees who are 
                                                      
22. To be capitalized means to create or add to basis. So, the amount paid to acquire a long-term 
expenditure is not immediately deducted; it creates a cost basis in the expenditure that is recovered 
gradually through amortization or, in the case of intangibles that are ineligible for amortization, is 
recovered upon disposition of the asset. 
23. Regulation 1.167(a)-3 provides for ratable amortization over the useful life of certain 
intangibles. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004). A different rule applies if the intangible is 
acquired as part of the acquisition of a trade or business, and that rule requires ratable amortization of 
all intangibles acquired in connection with the trade or business over the fifteen-year period following 
acquisition of the trade or business. See 26 U.S.C. § 197 (2016). 
24. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. Comm’r, 685 F.2d 212, 214 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The 
object of sections 162 and 263 of the Code, read together, is to match up expenditures with the income 
they generate. Where the income is generated over a period of years[,] the expenditures should be 
classified as capital . . . .”). 
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subject to noncompetes. The IRS—like employers—behaves as though 
compensation is exclusively in exchange for employees’ current labors and 
is not even partially in exchange for employees’ agreements to be subject to 
noncompetes. 
This Article proposes a change. The IRS should stop allowing employers 
to fully, immediately deduct the compensation that they pay to employees 
subject to noncompetes. Stopping this practice would end a significant and 
unexamined tax subsidy in favor of employers using and expanding 
employment noncompetes.25 Instead, when an employer subjects an 
employee to a noncompete, the IRS should require the employer to establish 
the value of that noncompete. It is an intangible asset with future value that 
the employer will receive gradually over the restricted period, beginning 
after the employment relationship ends. Then, the IRS should require the 
employer to allocate the employee’s total compensation between a portion 
that pays for the noncompete and a remaining portion that compensates for 
current labor. The portion allocated to the noncompete should not be 
immediately deductible. Instead, it should be capitalized and amortized 
ratably over the restricted period. The IRS should permit immediate 
deduction only for the portion of compensation that is for current labor.  
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I will detail the prevalence and 
harms of employment noncompetes. Part II identifies features of contract-
law-based approaches to curtailing noncompetes that have prevented these 
approaches from being more successful. If future approaches are to be more 
successful, they should not share these features. Part III exposes the IRS’s 
current treatment of employment noncompetes and argues that it is wrong. 
Although fundamental, normative rules of income tax require that costs 
associated with future benefits be capitalized and recovered gradually over 
the period benefitted, the IRS has ignored these rules by allowing employers 
to fully, immediately deduct the compensation that they pay to their 
employees in exchange for noncompetes. The IRS’s current treatment of 
employment noncompetes unfortunately incentivizes employers to use them 
more frequently and more broadly than they otherwise would. Part IV 
proposes that employers should no longer be allowed to immediately deduct 
the compensation that they pay to employees subject to noncompetes. It 
details how employers should be required to capitalize the portion of 
compensation equal to the value of the noncompete. Part V is optimistic 
because this tax-law-based approach to curtailing noncompetes avoids the 
                                                      
25. When employers immediately deduct the full cost of an investment that has long-term value, 
that treatment is equivalent under certain conditions to exempting the investment from tax. See infra 
notes 271–277 and accompanying text; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Comm’r, 71 F.3d 209 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(discussing the importance of the timing of a deduction). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/2
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many features that caused contract-law-based approaches to fail. As a result, 
it holds unique promise. 
I. PREVALENCE AND HARMS OF EMPLOYMENT NONCOMPETES 
A. Prevalence 
Employment noncompetes restrain an increasing number of American 
workers.26 Currently, nearly one in five (or thirty million27) American 
workers is covered by an employment noncompete agreement. The largest 
study of noncompete use in the United States was conducted in 201428 by 
researchers J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara, and Evan Starr. Their survey 
was “completed by more than 11,500 labor force participants from a range 
of industries and with varied demographics, experiences, earnings, and 
expectations”29 and found that “38.1% of employees had signed a 
noncompete at some point in their lives”30 and currently, “about 18% of 
labor force participants are bound by noncompetition agreements.”31 As the 
Treasury Department’s Office of Economic Policy reported, this means that 
nearly thirty million American workers are currently covered by 
employment noncompete agreements.32 Accordingly, understanding the 
consequences of employment noncompete agreements “for workers and the 
broader economy is therefore of great importance, especially in light of its 
central role in determining workers’ prospects for wage growth and job 
mobility.”33 
                                                      
26. See, e.g., ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE 
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 793–833 (2013) (describing the expansion of employment 
noncompetes and other employer tools for restricting employee job mobility). 
27. See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS: 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 6 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ 
economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/84RF-6LWZ]. 
28. Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 1, at 397. 
29. Id. at 395. 
30. Starr, Bishara & Prescott, supra note 3, at 2; see also OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T 
OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at 6 (estimating that about thirty-seven percent of workers have been 
subject to a noncompete at least once during their careers). 
31. Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 1, at 461. 
32. OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at 6. 
33. Id. at 25. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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While employment noncompetes were initially designed to prevent 
highly-compensated executives from appropriating valuable and protected 
company secrets, they increasingly restrain post-employment opportunities 
for lower-wage workers who are unlikely to have access to these secrets.34 
According to the 2016 Department of Treasury Report, less than half of 
workers bound by noncompete agreements report that their jobs give them 
access to trade secret information.35 Approximately 15% of workers without 
four-year college degrees and approximately 14% of workers earning 
$40,000 or less annually are covered by noncompete agreements even 
though these workers are less than half as likely to have access to trade 
secret information as their coworkers with degrees or higher annual 
earnings.36 
Well-known companies have used employment noncompetes 
aggressively with their rank-and-file employees and have encountered 
media and public criticism as a result. For example, Amazon subjected 
hourly and even seasonal workers to employment noncompetes, providing 
that “for 18 months after the Separation Date, Employee will not, directly 
or indirectly, whether on Employee’s own behalf or on behalf of any other 
entity (for example, as an employee, agent, partner, or consultant), engage 
in or support the development, manufacture, marketing, or sale of any 
product or service that competes or is intended to compete with any product 
or service sold, offered, or otherwise provided by Amazon (or intended to 
be sold, offered, or otherwise provided by Amazon in the future) that 
Employee worked on or supported, or about which Employee obtained or 
received Confidential Information.”37 Amazon’s employment noncompete 
did not contain any geographic limitation and, in fact, included a recitation 
whereby the employee acknowledged that “the geographic areas for many 
of Amazon’s products and services — and, by extension, the geographic 
areas applicable to [the noncompete] restrictions . . . are extremely broad 
and in many cases worldwide.”38 Amazon’s use of employment 
noncompetes was exposed and criticized by the online publication, The 
Verge. As The Verge’s reporting noted, since Amazon sells an 
                                                      
34. See, e.g., id. at 7 (“The conventional picture of a workplace characterized by non-compete 
agreements is one that features trade secrets, including sophisticated technical information and business 
practices that firms have a strong interest in protecting.”). 
35. Id. at 4. 
36. Id. 
37. Spencer Woodman, Exclusive: Amazon Makes Even Temporary Warehouse Workers Sign 
18-Month Non-Competes, THE VERGE (Mar. 26, 2015, 11:44 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/3 
/26/8280309/amazon-warehouse-jobs-exclusive-noncompete-contracts [https://perma.cc/T5WN-7N 
JW]. 
38. Id.; Jana Kasperkevic, Amazon to Remove Non-Compete Clause from Contracts for Hourly 
Workers, THE GUARDIAN (Mar 27, 2015, 17:56 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/ 
mar/27/amazon-remove-noncompete-clause-contracts-hourly-workers [https://perma.cc/FG35-CDH7].  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2018] NONCOMPETES AS TAX EVASION 275 
 
 
 
 
“extraordinary breadth” of products, this noncompete provision required 
“temp[orary] workers to foreswear a sizable portion of the global economy 
in exchange for a several-months-long hourly warehouse gig.”39 The 
necessity of such a broad restriction is hard to justify, especially for workers 
like the couple featured in the article, Regina and Ray Lee, who perform 
seasonal warehouse work for Amazon and “box stuff every day and send it 
off.” Following this scrutiny, Amazon admitted that it had subjected 
seasonal and hourly workers to the noncompete provision but had not 
enforced it against them.40 Amazon then agreed to remove the clause from 
employment contracts with seasonal and hourly employees.41 
Jimmy John’s sandwich chain faced not only media scrutiny but a state-
initiated lawsuit for its gratuitous use of employment noncompetes. On June 
8, 2016, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed a Complaint against 
Jimmy John’s calling its use of employment noncompete agreements 
“unreasonable, unconscionable, and unenforceable under Illinois law….”42 
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that for years,43 Jimmy John’s required 
even “at-will, low-wage employees,”44 whose “primary function concerns 
the receipt of orders, the preparation of food, and the delivery of food,”45 to 
“sign non-competition agreements that limit their employment options for 
years after leaving employment at a [Jimmy John’s] sandwich shop.”46 
Because the same noncompete “agreement was required for all employees . 
. . irrespective of title or job function” and newly hired employees “were 
required to sign [it] as a condition of employment,”47 it reached many 
                                                      
39. Woodman, supra note 37. 
40. Kasperkevic, supra note 38 (quoting an Amazon spokeswoman saying that the noncompete 
“clause hasn’t been applied to hourly associates”). 
41. Id. (quoting an Amazon spokeswoman saying that Amazon would remove the noncompete 
clause for hourly associates).  
42. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, & Other Equitable Relief at ¶ 52, 
Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Jimmy John’s Enters., No. 2016CH07746 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 8, 2016), 2016 
WL 3211206; Daniel Wiessner, Illinois Attorney General Sues Jimmy John’s over Non-Compete 
Agreements, REUTERS (June 8, 2016, 7:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jimmyjohns-law 
suit-idUSKCN0YU2RS [https://perma.cc/4DEG-DHP8]. 
43. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, & Other Equitable Relief, supra note 
42, at ¶ 50. 
44. Id. at ¶ 1 
45. Id. at ¶ 13. 
46. Id. at ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
47. Id. at ¶ 18. 
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employees with no or only “minimal access to confidential or trade secret 
information.”48  
Like Amazon, Jimmy John’s stated that it did not intend to enforce the 
noncompete agreements against its former sandwich makers or delivery 
employees.49 However, secretly planning not to enforce a written contract 
provision does not solve the problem. As the Complaint alleges, 
noncompete agreements “can significantly disrupt the labor market”50 even 
if they are not enforced because, “particularly with respect to the low-wage 
workforce[,] [they] . . . have a chilling effect on the efforts of employees to 
seek continued employment in a field in which they have gained 
familiarity.”51 Further, “[t]he use of non-competition agreements for at-will, 
low-wage workers . . . hinders upward mobility of workers looking for 
higher wages or advancement . . . and suppresses wages for employees who 
have limited negotiating power with both current and potential new 
employers.”52  
Restraining the employment opportunities of low-wage workers is 
troubling from a distributional perspective. It is also troubling from a macro-
economic perspective. As the Complaint alleges, noncompete agreements 
“have a chilling effect on the ability of Illinois businesses to freely hire 
workers, by potentially subjecting these businesses to litigation, and by 
limiting the pool of available workers.”53 In December 2016, the case was 
settled by a consent decree requiring Jimmy John’s to rescind existing 
noncompetes, remove all noncompetes from “new hire” paperwork, and 
“[n]otify all current and former employees that their non-competition 
agreements are unenforceable.”54 
B. Harms 
Media outlets and attorneys general are right to be concerned. 
Employment noncompetes have extensive negative growth effects, negative 
distributional effects, and negative ethical effects. These harms far outweigh 
the benefits that employment noncompetes provide by encouraging 
employers to train their employees, trust their employees, and fully involve 
their employees in innovation.55 
                                                      
48. Id. at ¶ 15. 
49. Id. at ¶ 27. 
50. Id. at ¶ 69. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at ¶ 70. 
53. Id. at ¶ 69. 
54. Press Release, Ill. Attorney General, Madigan Announces Settlement with Jimmy John’s for 
Imposing Unlawful Non-Compete Agreements (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/ 
pressroom/2016_12/20161207.html [https://perma.cc/4CVE-A6SE]. 
55. See supra note 16. 
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1. Negative Growth Effects 
Employment noncompete agreements undermine competition. They 
deprive the economy of employee productivity and make workers less 
productive.  
For several centuries, courts and policymakers have understood the 
anticompetitive nature of noncompete agreements and have looked for ways 
to mitigate their anticompetitive harms. As Harlan Blake noted in his 
seminal article, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, “[c]ovenants of this 
type comprise one of the traditional common-law ‘restraints of trade’ and 
present problems which have kept them before the courts for more than five 
hundred years.”56 Specifically, courts and policymakers have long 
understood that they “diminish competition by intimidating potential 
competitors”57 and prevent potential competitors from poaching labor and 
putting that labor to a more efficient use. Further, by preventing the 
information sharing that naturally occurs when an employee brings her 
knowledge and expertise to a new employer, they slow “down the 
dissemination of ideas, processes, and methods.”58 Thus, “from the social 
point of view,” they “clog the market’s channeling of manpower to 
employments in which its productivity is greatest.”59 
One of the most influential studies of the negative growth effects of 
employee noncompetes was published in 1999 by Stanford professor of law 
and business, Ronald Gilson. Gilson compared two high-technology 
industrial districts—California’s Silicon Valley and Massachusetts’s Route 
128—to explain why the Silicon Valley thrived while Route 128 did not.60 
Gilson concluded that Route 128’s use of employment noncompetes 
impeded innovation and discouraged economic growth.61 In contrast, 
“[b]ecause California does not enforce post-employment covenants not to 
compete, high technology firms in Silicon Valley gain from knowledge 
                                                      
56. Blake, supra note 2, at 626. 
57. Id. at 627. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon 
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). 
61. Id.  
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spillovers between firms. These knowledge spillovers have allowed Silicon 
Valley firms to thrive while Route 128 firms have deteriorated.”62  
Gilson’s article was and is extremely influential, and for good reason. It 
indicates that policies that curtail the use of employment noncompetes can 
advance the public good by encouraging innovation, facilitating knowledge-
sharing, and fostering economic growth.  
Further, Gilson’s article provides support for a view of employment 
noncompetes not simply as a shift of benefits from the public to employers, 
but as a collective action problem. Employers in Silicon Valley collectively 
benefited from that region’s knowledge-sharing, innovation, and growth. 
They benefited by receiving employees who brought with them tacit 
knowledge and know-how gained at their prior jobs. But employers have 
little control over what agreements govern their prospective employees. 
Instead, they control what agreements govern their current employees and, 
with respect to their current employees, employers want to retain 
employees, inhibit mobility, and prevent knowledge-sharing. If every 
employer was to select an overall regional culture, one might reasonably 
expect employers to select the growth-fostering culture of competition. 
However, since every employer instead only selects its own company 
policy, it selects the protective regime of noncompetes.63 
While Gilson’s article illustrates powerfully how an economy, and even 
the employers within that economy, are harmed by employment 
noncompete agreements, significant changes have occurred since 1999. 
Noncompetes have become more common64 and more frequently bind rank-
and-file employees.65 Mounting evidence indicates that contract law’s 
formal treatment of noncompete agreements—and thus Gilson’s 
comparison between an enforcement-hostile regime like Silicon Valley and 
an enforcement-friendly regime like Route 128—is less important than the 
actual prevalence and use of noncompete agreements.66 And labor 
economics suggests that employer monopsony-like power—the power of an 
employer to pay a lower wage than would prevail in a competitive 
                                                      
62. Id.  
63. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, 
POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES 7 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4LZ-5X4J]. (“While not necessarily in 
the interest of an individual firm, more rapid dissemination of ideas and technology improvements can 
have significant positive impacts for the larger regional economy in terms of innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and attracting more businesses and jobs to a region. Non-competes that stifle mobility 
of workers who can disseminate knowledge and ideas to new startups or companies moving to a region 
can limit the process that leads to agglomeration economies.”) (emphasis added). 
64. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
65. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
66. See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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market67—is on the rise.68 Each of these developments presents a need to 
consider how employment noncompetes affect competition in the current 
United States economy. A recent report by the Council of Economic 
Advisers and recent economic studies fill this need. 
In October 2016, the Council of Economic Advisers issued a report 
concluding that the extensive use of employment noncompetes and, in 
particular, the extensive use “among workers who are unlikely to have 
access to trade secrets” threatens to undermine efficiencies offered by free 
market competition.69 Although the report acknowledges that employment 
noncompetes “are not always harmful to workers or to growth” and, in some 
instances, can encourage training and innovation by protecting employers 
from the risk that their employees will misappropriate their intellectual 
property, it concludes that “the use of [employment] non-competes in the 
United States today extends well beyond cases where they are plausibly 
justified.”70  
Instead of primarily encouraging training, innovation, or growth, the 
Council found that “the primary effect of [employment noncompete] 
agreements is to impede worker mobility and limit wage competition.”71 
Noncompetes “are often used to create or exercise market power” and, in 
particular, “to solidify [employer] bargaining power vis-à-vis their 
workers.”72 Unfortunately, employers already tend to exert excessive 
                                                      
67. See Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1870 n.121 
(2018), (“Joan Robinson coined the term ‘monopsony’ to describe employer market power over 
wages.”); id. at 1870–71 n.121 (providing citations to more recent accounts of monopsony power); id. 
at 1870 (“In the labor market, monopsonistic employers can pay lower wages to workers than would 
otherwise prevail in a competitive market without losing those workers to competing employers.”).  
68. See infra note 78 and accompanying text; Hafiz, supra note 67, at 1871–72 & n.128 
(“Economists and policymakers increasingly recognize the existence of employer monopsony power in 
labor markets based on direct evidence of collusion between employers and non-compete agreements, 
as well as indirect evidence of minimum wage impacts on employment, wage-setting, and wage 
discrimination.”); id. at 1872 (“Beginning in the 1990s, economists began finding that minimum wage 
increases were not accompanied by job loss, indicating that wages have not been bid up to the marginal 
value of labor.”). 
69. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY: TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND POLICY RESPONSES 8 (Oct. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/ 
files/20161025_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT2S-F8SG].  
70. Id. at 5. 
71. Id.  
72. Id. at 8. 
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bargaining power. In the current American labor market, employers often 
pay lower-than-efficient wages73 due to high costs and frictions of changing 
jobs,74 a lack of transparency about the competing wages and benefits 
offered by various jobs,75 an erosion of the minimum wage,76 and a decline 
in unions and collective bargaining.77 Considering employment 
noncompetes in the context of the modern American labor market, the 
Counsel concluded that “employers may be better able to exercise 
monopsony power today than they were in past decades.”78 
When employers artificially depress wages, they also depress economic 
output. Employment noncompetes, like other “forces that undermine 
competition[,] tend to reduce efficiency, and can lead to lower output, 
employment, and social welfare.”79 For example, they “can lead to 
inefficient reductions in employment and output, where some workers who 
would have been willing to work at the competitive market wage are never 
hired, and the output they would have produced is produced less efficiently 
by other firms if at all.”80  
Recent academic research supports the Council of Economic Advisers’ 
conclusion that the anti-competitive harms of employment noncompete 
agreements outweigh their potentially pro-competitive benefits. For 
example, a study on Noncompetes and Employee Mobility found that 
noncompetes inhibit job mobility and increase frictions that prevent 
employees from moving to higher paying positions.81 As the researchers 
explain: 
Noncompetes function to create additional moving costs when the 
[new job] offer is from a competitor—whether in the form of guilt, 
fear of litigation, or potential delay. As a result, noncompetes 
increase the threshold wage a competitor must offer to induce 
movement, reducing the likelihood that the employee will accept [a 
                                                      
73. See supra note 68 (providing evidence that in the current labor market, wages are artificially 
depressed). 
74. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 69, at 4 (“But importantly, wage-setting power 
can also occur naturally—even in markets with many employers— due to frictions that limit workers 
choices or mobility.”). 
75. Id. at 14. 
76. Id. at 13 (“[T]he real value of the Federal minimum wage has declined 24 percent since its 
peak of $9.55 (in 2015 dollars) in 1968 . . . .”). 
77. Id. at 12–13 (“[U]nion membership has declined consistently since the 1970s. . . . Research 
suggests that declining unionization accounts for between a fifth and a third of the increase in [wage] 
inequality since the 1970s.”). 
78. Id. at 10. 
79. Id. at 1. 
80. Id. at 3. 
81. Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompetes and Employee Mobility (Univ. of 
Mich. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 16-032, 2016) (on file with author). Paper cited with permission 
of the authors. 
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new job offer].82 
To the extent that a new job offers higher compensation because it puts the 
employee’s skills to a higher, better use, labor productivity is lost due to the 
noncompete.  
Additional studies indicate that employment noncompetes negatively 
interfere with markets. They “limit entrepreneurship,”83 “impede 
innovation,”84 cause entrepreneurial employees to open businesses in 
industries that are unrelated to their past jobs rather than taking maximum 
advantage of knowledge learned and skills developed in their past jobs,85 
cause affluent employees to place themselves on “involuntary sabbatical[s]” 
to wait out the term of the noncompete,86 cause employees who violate or 
arguably violate their noncompetes to “withdr[aw] from professional 
contacts in order that they might remain undetected,”87 and are associated 
with wage suppression that persists over the course of a worker’s career 
even if the worker changes jobs or relocates across state lines.88 
Noncompetes are associated with employees investing less in their own 
                                                      
82. Id. at 14. 
83. Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or 
Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 428 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1280; see 
also LOBEL, supra note 26, at 350 (explaining that restricting employee mobility “stymies the entry of 
new competitors into the market and suppresses the spirit of entrepreneurship which is vital to any 
economy”). 
84. Samila & Sorenson, supra note 83, at 428.  
85. Evan Starr, Natarajan Balasubramanian & Mariko Sakakibara, Screening Spinouts? How 
Noncompete Enforceability Affects the Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms, 64 MGMT. SCI. 
552 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2614. 
86. Matt Marx & Lee Fleming, Non-Compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry . . . and Exit?, in 
12 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 39, 50 (Josh Lerner 
& Scott Stern eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2012), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12452.pdf. 
87. Id.  
88. Natarajan Balasubramanian et al., Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to 
Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers 30 (Ross Sch. of Bus., Paper No. 1339, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905782 (“[W]e also find that compared with their peers in low-enforceability 
states, workers in states with high enforceability receive reduced wages throughout a given job as well 
as over their career.”); id. at 15 & 51 (explaining that the “persistent wage suppressing effect” of 
noncompetes and the reduced bargaining power they provide employees “offset[s] potential gains to the 
employee” of a noncompete, like training or increased employer investment in the employee); id. at 32 
(“Our last finding . . . [regarding the effects of covenant not to compete (CNC)] enforceability over the 
career of the employee suggests that [simply] starting a job in a higher enforceability state—regardless 
of whether the individual eventually leaves that state—is associated with reduced earnings up to eight 
years later. . . . [O]ur results strongly suggest that CNC enforceability lowers worker welfare . . . .”). 
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training and human capital89 and performing lower quality work.90 At least 
one study indicates that the negative effects of employment noncompetes 
spill over to “unconstrained” workers (those not bound by noncompetes) by 
causing market-wide reductions to job offer rates, job mobility rates, and 
prevailing wages.91  
2. Negative Distributional Effects 
Long before the media accounts of Amazon and Jimmy John’s, courts 
recognized the potential that employers would use noncompetes to exploit 
their workers, especially their lower-paid or vulnerable workers. For 
example, in a 1952 case about Arthur Murray Dance Studios subjecting its 
dance instructors to noncompetes, the court recognized that “[t]he average, 
individual employee has little but his labor to sell or to use to make a living. 
He is often in urgent need of selling it and in no position to object to boiler 
plate restricted covenants placed before him to sign.”92 The less resources a 
worker has, the less able he is to resist a noncompete. 
This concern is reinforced by the Council of Economic Advisers’ report. 
The report not only concludes that firms with monopsony power are able to 
exploit that power to “pay lower wages”93 and “shift some of the benefits of 
production from wages to profits,”94 it concludes that this phenomenon is at 
least partially to blame for “slow wage growth and rising inequality” in the 
current U.S. labor market.95  
The report warns that noncompetes decrease the correlation between 
wages and productivity and increase the correlation between wages and 
bargaining power.96 In an efficient wage market, “each firm will bid up the 
wage to recruit workers from other firms as long as the revenue it can earn 
by hiring another worker exceeds the wage it must pay—establishing a close 
link between wages and worker productivity.”97 However, monopsony 
                                                      
89. Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive 
Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 413–14 (2011); On Amir & Orly 
Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833, 846 
(2013). 
90. Amir & Lobel, supra note 89, at 863 (observing decline in quality of work of restricted 
employees). 
91. Evan Starr, Justin Frake & Rajshree Agarwal, Mobility Constraint Externalities: How 
Noncompetes Shackle the Unconstrained 29 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3027715. 
92. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 703–04 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. of 1952). 
93. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 69, at 15. 
94. Id. at 2. 
95. Id. at 1. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 2; see also id. at 9 (“Economic theory suggests that in competitive markets, wages are 
. . . bid up until they just equal the marginal value of labor to the firm . . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2018] NONCOMPETES AS TAX EVASION 283 
 
 
 
 
power, which employment noncompetes foster, prevents wages from being 
bid up to near the worker productivity line and “opens up the possibility that 
wages can differ—both between and within firms—even among workers 
with similar skills.”98 Workers are not paid based on what their labor is 
worth but based on what they will accept. Thus,  
if employers with monopsony power are able to differentiate among 
workers’ reservation wages, then they can also set wages that 
discriminate among their own employees[,] . . . pay[ing] each worker 
the minimum he or she is willing to accept, regardless of the worker’s 
skills or productivity. More generally, differing degrees of worker 
bargaining power across different groups of workers—for example 
by age, race or gender—may lead to varying degrees of wage 
depression, promoting within-firm wage inequality. For example, if 
women’s job mobility is more constrained than men’s by family 
responsibilities, then women will be more limited in their choice of 
employers and be more vulnerable to wage discrimination.99 
Among employees already bound by noncompetes, an employer’s power 
will be greatest against employees who do not have meaningful access to 
legal counsel, are unwilling to aggressively challenge the enforceability of 
a noncompete, or are unwilling or unable to move out of the geographically 
restricted area for more lucrative employment.100  
                                                      
98. Id. at 3. 
99. Id. at 3; see also Hafiz, supra note 67, at 1894 (“[M]onopsonistic wage-setting can also 
weaken the link between labor productivity and wages because when firms no longer compete 
aggressively for workers, wages differ between and within firms, and even among workers with similar 
skills. These ‘differing degrees of worker bargaining power across different groups of workers . . . may 
lead to varying degrees of wage depression [and] within-firm inequality[,]’ particularly for workers in 
protected classes under the employment discrimination laws.”) (alterations in original except the first) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN 
LABOR MARKETS 4 (2003)). 
100. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 69, at 9 (noting that women may be 
disproportionately harmed by employment noncompetes because “domestic responsibilities [more] 
often act as a constraint on women’s job search”). 
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Finally, while the Author is unaware of studies on this question, it seems 
reasonable to fear that employment noncompetes may prevent victims of 
workplace harassment from perceiving or using exit options.101 
3. Negative Ethical Effects 
Of course, there are negative ethical implications to all the harms already 
described: interfering with economic markets, stifling growth, slowing 
innovation, inhibiting labor mobility, worsening monopsonies, depressing 
wages, contributing to income inequality, and particularly harming 
vulnerable workers. The purpose of this section is to suggest that while 
some harms of employment noncompetes are primarily economic, and some 
primarily distributional, there are also primarily ethical harms. Employment 
noncompetes undermine shared values of personal freedom and fairness.102 
As Harlan Blake recognized,  
Every postemployment restraint, for whatever reason imposed, has 
inevitable effects which in some degree oppose commonly shared 
community values. In view of our feeling that a man should not be 
able to barter away his personal freedom, even this small degree of 
servitude is distasteful. It is particularly distasteful if there is no 
effective bargaining between the parties—as in the situation in which 
the employer knows that everyone else in the industry insists on the 
covenant too, or when the employment officers have no authority to 
change the provisions of the employment contract form. The values 
offended are more social or political than economic.103  
                                                      
101. See also Joe Biden, We Heard Your Stories. It’s Time to #LetUsCompete, MEDIUM (Oct. 25, 
2016) https://medium.com/@VPOTUS44/we-heard-your-stories-its-time-to-letuscompete-1b440782a8 
ae [https://perma.cc/M4PQ-EE7B] (“I heard from a woman in Ohio who, after having the courage to 
leave an abusive marriage, was threatened with lawsuits for taking an entry-level sales job at a new 
company.”); Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Laeng, No. 8:12-cv-2280-T-33MAP, 2013 WL 499982, 
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2013) (finding “no controlling authority” to support former employee’s claim 
that she was relieved of the obligation to comply with an employment noncompete because her former 
employer “allowed one of its employees to sexually assault and harass [her], failed to investigate those 
claims, created a hostile work environment, and retaliated against her by constructive discharge.”). 
102. While this section describes ethical harms of employment noncompetes, its purpose is not to 
take a position on the question of whether and when these ethical harms are sufficiently serious to justify 
setting aside otherwise valid contracts because they are employment noncompetes. Because this 
Article’s proposal does not set aside noncompetes, it does not present that question.  
103. Blake, supra note 2, at 650. 
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Employment noncompetes trade freedoms that we are uncomfortable being 
the subject of exchange,104 particularly when the exchange is less than fully 
free.105 
These ethical concerns are heightened due to “the profound changes that 
are occurring in the employment relationship in the United States.”106 As 
Professor Katherine Stone traces, “[f]irms are dismantling their internal 
labor markets and abandoning their implicit promises of orderly promotion 
and long-term job security. No longer is employment centered on a single, 
primary employer.”107  
Employers, who no longer offer “implicit promises of job security,”108 
now seek to attract, retain, and motivate employees by implicitly promising 
them employability security. They promise to provide employees training, 
skill development, and professional network building that will make them 
                                                      
104. See, e.g., Mandeville v. Harman, 7 A. 37, 38 (N.J. Ch. 1886) (“[N]o principle of law is more 
generally recognized than that a contract which precludes a person from the right to employ his talents, 
his industry, or his capital, in any useful undertaking, is void.”); id. at 40 (“Professional skill, experience, 
and reputation are things which cannot be bought or sold. They constitute part of the individuality of the 
particular person, and die with him.”); id. at 40–41 (describing skill, ability, and professional practice as 
things “so purely personal” that they “can have neither an intrinsic nor a market value.”); id. at 41 (“It 
is one of the natural rights of every citizen of this state to use his skill and labor in any useful 
employment, not only to get food, raiment, and shelter, but to acquire property; and I think it may be 
regarded as very certain that the courts will never deprive any one of this right, or even abridge it, except 
in obedience to the sternest demands of justice.”). For a summary of the broader debate about what 
valuable assets should and should not be permissibly sold, see, e.g., Note, The Price of Everything, the 
Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2003). 
105. Employment noncompetes are often executed under conditions lacking procedural fairness. 
See, e.g., OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at 12–13 (citing a survey 
of “members of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers” finding that “barely [30% of] 
workers reported that they were told about the non-compete in their job offer,” while “[i]n nearly 70% 
of cases, the worker was asked to sign the non-compete after accepting the offer—and, consequently, 
after having turned down (all) other offers.”); id. at 13 (citing a different survey finding that “only 10 
percent of workers with non-competes report bargaining over [any terms in] their non-compete, with 38 
percent of non-bargainers not realizing that they could even negotiate.”). 
106. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing 
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 519 (2001). See also Kenneth G. 
Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology: Implications for Labor and 
Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2001) (explaining that globalization and the rapid pace of 
technological innovation has “undermined long-term employment relationships and brought the market 
into the firm in ways that have not previously been experienced”). 
107. Stone, supra note 106, at 519. 
108. Id. at 524. 
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marketable to future employers.109 In the current labor market, the “promise 
of employability security . . . is treated as a substitute for the former promise 
of employment security.”110 Thus, employees who change jobs now 
reasonably expect to continue to reap the rewards of their training, skill 
development, and even networks with new employers.111 As Stone argues, 
courts should uphold these expectations. “When employers argue for 
enforcement of noncompete covenants . . . courts should inquire as to 
whether the promise of general training was expressly or tacitly part of the 
employment deal. If it was, then they should not restrain employees from 
subsequently using the knowledge so obtained.”112 
In the current labor market, an employee’s use of her training to benefit 
future employers is not an act of disloyalty; it is an act of necessity. As a 
result, an employer’s effort to prevent that use is not an act of reasonable 
self-protection; it is an act of unfairness. Employers no longer offer their 
employees long-term employment and can no longer demand that their 
employees forfeit skills or value when the employment relationship ends. 
As Stone explains,  
[U]nder the new employment contract, employees have been 
promised not only training, upskilling, and networking, but also the 
ability to use their newly acquired skills in subsequent employment. 
Networking, training, and lateral mobility are a fundamental aspect 
of today’s employment system. While individual employers may 
have an incentive to offer these benefits and then renege, the courts 
should not support them in doing so.113  
Fairness in the current labor market is best achieved if employees are able 
to leave their jobs equally or more marketable than when they started them. 
Noncompetes undermine fairness in the labor market by inhibiting a 
worker’s ability to take her newly acquired skills to a new job. This ability 
is particularly important when a worker’s current employer does not offer 
advancement opportunities, seniority benefits, or long-term employment 
prospects.  
                                                      
109. See id. at 590–91 (“[E]mployers in today’s workplace often promise to provide general 
training as part of the new psychological contract. One of the most important terms of the new 
psychological contract is the employers’ promise of general training and employability security in 
exchange for employee motivation, commitment, and organizational citizenship behavior. Employers 
also promise to provide general training in order to attract applicants. Thus, many firms offer to pay for 
some types of employee education as an inducement for recruitment.”). 
110. Id. at 525. 
111. Id. (“[T]raining and skill development are part of the employment deal, [thus] employees 
who leave firms to take other jobs should be able to take their general human capital with them.”).  
112. Id. at 591. 
113. Id. at 592. 
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C. State Responses 
This Article does not aim to detail the various state law responses to 
employment noncompetes. Detailed accounts are available elsewhere, 
including in online resources that account for rapid change.114 Rather, it 
aims to show that states have used a wide variety of contract-law-based 
responses to employment noncompetes. In their work as “laboratories of 
democracy,”115 conducting “novel social and economic experiments,”116 
states have tested a variety of approaches. Unfortunately, their experience 
demonstrates that contract-law-based approaches, no matter the form, have 
proven to be inadequate and largely unsuccessful. What no state has done is 
to test a tax-law-based approach to curtailing noncompetes, like the one 
proposed in this Article. 
States have attempted to limit the harms caused by employment 
noncompetes by implementing resistance grounded in contract law. 
California,117 North Dakota,118 and Oklahoma119 generally prohibit judicial 
enforcement of employment noncompetes. Many other states will only 
enforce an employment noncompete if it is supported by separately stated 
                                                      
114. See, e.g., Beck Reed Riden LLP, Employee Noncompetes: A State by State Survey, FAIR 
COMPETITION L. (July 11, 2017), https://www.faircompetitionlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ 
Noncompetes-50-State-Survey-Chart-20170711.pdf (providing a fifty-state survey of employment 
noncompete laws updated by the law firm, Beck Reed Riden); SEYFARTH SHAW, 50 STATE DESKTOP 
REFERENCE: WHAT EMPLOYERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT NON-COMPETE AND TRADE SECRETS LAW 
(2016), http://www.seyfarth.com/uploads/siteFiles/practices/141926_Chartof TradeAgreementsbyState 
_Final.pdf (providing a fifty-state survey of employment noncompete laws updated by the law firm, 
Seyfarth Shaw).  
115. “Laboratories of democracy” is a phrase made famous by Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  
116. Id. 
117. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600, 16601, 16602, and 16602.5 (2018) (prohibiting 
employment noncompetes with narrow exceptions). 
118. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2017). 
119. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 219A (2018). 
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consideration.120 New Hampshire121 and Oregon122 will only enforce an 
employment noncompete if the prospective employee was given sufficient 
notice that she would be subject to an employment noncompete prior to 
accepting her job offer. Other states will only enforce a noncompete if the 
restricted period is less than a state-imposed cap of twelve months123 or 
eighteen months124 or twenty-four months125 or will reduce durations that 
exceed those caps.126 Other states have established time limits for 
employment noncompetes within which they are presumed reasonable and 
beyond which they are presumed unreasonable.127 Others will enforce 
employment noncompetes only against certain categories of workers, like 
highly-compensated employees with access to inside information,128 or will 
refuse to enforce noncompetes against other categories of workers, like 
health care workers or low-income workers.129 Some states will refuse to 
enforce noncompetes against discharged employees130 or employees 
discharged without cause.131 Most states will only enforce a noncompete if 
it is judicially determined to be reasonable in duration, scope, and 
geographic reach, or will rewrite overly broad restrictions to meet these 
reasonableness standards.132  
                                                      
120. See, e.g., Beck Reed Riden LLP, supra note 114 (showing separately stated and sometimes 
“adequate” consideration required in Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming). Note that even when the 
consideration must be separately stated, it can still come in the form of compensation, a bonus, or a raise. 
121. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70 (2018) (providing New Hampshire’s notice requirement). 
122. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(a)(A) (2017) (providing Oregon’s notice requirement). 
123. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (LexisNexis 2018) (limiting noncompetes in Utah 
to twelve months). 
124. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(2) (limiting noncompetes in Oregon to eighteen months). 
125. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2018) (limiting noncompetes in South Dakota to 
24 months); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:921C (2018) (limiting noncompetes in Louisiana to twenty-four 
months). 
126. See, e.g., Beck Reed Riden LLP, supra note 114 (showing states that couple time limit with 
reformation doctrine). 
127. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 44-2701, -2704 (2018) (providing that Idaho requires noncompetes 
be reasonable and establishing that an 18-month duration is rebuttably presumed reasonable). 
128. See, e.g., §§ 44-2701 to -2702 (providing that employment noncompetes will only be 
enforced as to specified “key employees”). 
129. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:31-a (2018) (excepting physicians from noncompete 
enforcement); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1I-1 to -5 (2018) (excepting health care practitioners); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 431.202(4) (West 2001) (excepting clerks and secretaries); Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 820  
ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1–90/10 (2017) (excepting workers who earn less than the greater of: (i) the federal, 
state, or local minimum wage or (ii) $13.00 per hour). 
130. SEYFARTH SHAW, supra note 114 (listing as jurisdictions that will not enforce noncompetes 
against discharged employees the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Montana).  
131. Id. (listing as jurisdictions that will not enforce noncompetes against employees discharged 
without cause Illinois and New York).  
132. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 
AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 17 (2005) (“[T]he English rule of reason remains the doctrinal scheme in a majority of 
states in this country.”); Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A 
Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 709 (1985) (noting that the English rule of reason from Mitchel 
v. Reynolds “has survived virtually unchanged to the present day”); Beck Reed Riden LLP, supra note 
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D. Federal Responses 
Contract law is primarily a matter of state law. Thus, federal responses 
to employment noncompetes have mainly aimed to gather and disseminate 
information and encourage states to pass laws to curtail employment 
noncompetes.  
On October 25, 2016, the Obama White House announced an initiative 
to increase competition in the labor market.133 As part of this initiative, it 
surveyed data on the use and prevalence of employment noncompetes,134 
reported on the various state law responses to employment noncompetes,135 
and distributed a Call to Action asking states to do more to constrain 
employment noncompetes,136 particularly as they apply to lower-wage 
employees.137  
                                                      
114 (tracking reasonableness requirements and states that allow judicial revision of unreasonable 
noncompetes via reformation doctrines, which allow courts to rewrite unreasonable provisions, or blue-
pencil doctrines, which allow courts to strike unreasonable provisions and retain the rest of the contract).  
133. Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Obama Administration Announces New Steps 
to Spur Competition in the Labor Market and Accelerate Wage Growth, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 25, 
2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/25/fact-sheet-obama-administra 
tion-announces-new-steps-spur-competition [https://perma.cc/4KB4-LDXG]. 
134. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 63, at 2. 
135. THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE REFORM: A POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO STATE POLICIES 
1 (Oct. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/state-by-statenon 
competesexplainer_unembargoedfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/AAT5-ZBHG] (providing information on 
state policies related to non-compete agreements as of October 2016). 
136. State Call to Action on Non-Compete Agreements, THE WHITE HOUSE 1–2, https://obama 
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/noncompetes-calltoaction-final.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/3K8R-KHS2]; Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 133 (“Non-compete agreements narrow 
the employment options for an estimated one in five workers in the United States. As the White 
House and Treasury reported earlier this year, there is substantial evidence of overuse and misuse of 
these clauses. Today, the Administration put out a call to action and set of best practices for state 
policymakers to enact reforms to reduce the prevalence of non-compete agreements that are hurting 
workers and regional economies.”) 
137. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 133. This encouragement followed the 
administration’s conclusion that “[a] considerable proportion of non-compete agreements signed by both 
low- and high-wage workers come at the expense of wage growth, entrepreneurship, and broader 
economic growth.” Id. See also White House Urges Ban on Non-Compete Agreements, NBC NEWS (Oct. 
26, 2016, 7:28 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/white-house-urges-ban-non-
compete-agreements-n673061 [https://perma.cc/64NT-Q2NN] (quoting then Vice President Joseph 
Biden’s statement that workers “can’t reach their true potential without freedom to negotiate for a higher 
wage with a new company, or to find another job . . . .”). 
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Specifically, the Obama White House asked state policymakers to 
pursue one or more of the following “best-practice policy objectives”: 
1. Ban non-compete clauses for categories of workers, such as 
workers under a certain wage threshold; workers in certain 
occupations that promote public health and safety; workers who are 
unlikely to possess trade secrets; or those who may suffer undue 
adverse impacts from non-competes, such as workers laid-off or 
terminated without cause. 
2. Improve transparency and fairness of non-compete agreements 
by, for example, disallowing non-competes unless they are proposed 
before a job offer or significant promotion has been accepted 
(because an applicant who has accepted an offer and declined other 
positions may have less bargaining power); providing consideration 
over and above continued employment for workers who sign non-
compete agreements; or encouraging employers to better inform 
workers about the law in their state and the existence of non-
competes in contracts and how they work. 
3. Incentivize employers to write enforceable contracts, and 
encourage the elimination of unenforceable provisions by, for 
example, promoting the use of the “red pencil doctrine,” which 
renders contracts with unenforceable provisions void in their 
entirety.138 
The Obama White House also called “on Congress to pass federal 
legislation to eliminate non-competes for workers under a certain salary 
threshold . . . .”139 While various members of Congress proposed bills to 
carry out this directive,140 no such bill has passed.  
Importantly, even if one or more of the best-practice policy objectives 
were implemented at the national level, there is reason to fear that it would 
not sufficiently curtail the damaging use of employment noncompetes. 
Each of the proposed policy objectives has been tested at the state level,141 
                                                      
138. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 133. 
139. Id.  
140. See, e.g., Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees Act (MOVE Act), S. 1504, 
114th Cong. (2015); see also Limiting the Ability to Demand Detrimental Employment Restrictions Act 
(LADDER Act), H.R. 2873, 114th Cong. (2015). On April 26, 2018, Senators Christopher Murphy, 
Elizabeth Warren, and Ron Wyden co-sponsored the Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S. 2782, 115th 
Cong. (2018) to prohibit employers from requiring their employees to sign noncompete agreements. 
That Act was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. A House 
version of the Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, H.R. 5631, was introduced on April 26, 2018. 
141. See supra notes 117–132 and accompanying text (showing that various states restrict 
noncompetes in the ways suggested by best-practice policy objectives, even before these objectives were 
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and the most extensive survey of noncompete use indicates that no state 
has yet effectively curtailed the damaging use of noncompetes.142  
II. WHY CONTRACT LAW IS A WEAKER APPROACH 
To be clear, this Article does not aim to dissuade lawmakers from using 
contract-law-based approaches to curtail employment noncompetes. 
Employment noncompetes are currently used in excessive and harmful 
ways, and it is appropriate that the law seek to restrain them. However, in 
light of data indicating that “employer behavior appears, at first blush, to be 
invariant to noncompete enforceability”143 and that changes to contract law 
do not meaningfully reduce the prevalence of noncompetes, this Article 
proposes a tax-law-based approach and argues that it holds the potential of 
being more effective than the contract-law-based approaches employed to 
date. This Part identifies several reasons that contract law has failed 
adequately to curtail employment noncompetes in an effort to anticipate 
whether tax law is likely to suffer—or instead might avoid—similar 
failures. 
A. Tension with Contract Law Principles 
Foundational principles of contract law support upholding written 
agreements between competent consenting adults. The freedom to 
contract—and to have contracts upheld—is “a central value of the liberal 
economic philosophy [that] permitted men of sound mind to enter 
arrangements as they saw fit.”144 Freedom to contract principles encourage 
courts to uphold employment noncompete agreements.145 Additionally, 
freedom to contract principles often trump other public policy 
considerations. As the early noncompete case, Printing & Numerical 
Registering Co. v. Sampson, warns,  
                                                      
published). See also THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 135, at 8 (showing that Nebraska, Nevada, South 
Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin already use the red pencil doctrine). 
142. Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 1, at 376–77. 
143. Id. at 462. 
144. OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at 30. 
145. Id. (citing Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. D. 351 (1880)). 
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It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those 
rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public 
policy, because if there is one thing which more than another public 
policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding 
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts 
when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall 
be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount 
public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with 
this freedom of contract.146  
Thus, as the Second Restatement of Contracts observes, “In general, parties 
may contract as they wish, and courts will enforce their agreements without 
passing on their substance.”147  
Many contract-law-based approaches to curtailing employment 
noncompetes are in tension with this foundational principle of freedom to 
contract. They seek to set aside otherwise valid written contracts entered 
into by competent consenting adults because they apply to the wrong class 
of worker, are for the wrong duration, or are for the wrong geographic area. 
Neither the contract nor the contracting parties decide what constitutes 
wrong. In the cases of California and North Dakota, employment 
noncompetes are set aside because their subject matter is wrong, regardless 
of their terms. That contract-law-based approaches require setting aside 
otherwise valid written contracts puts these approaches in tension with 
contract law’s foundational freedom of contract principle.  
This tension likely explains why a judge who finds a noncompete to be 
unenforceable often takes the additional step of acting, via the reformation 
doctrine or blue pencil doctrine, to cure defects in these contracts so that 
they can then be upheld.148 The effort to save even unlawful noncompetes 
likely reflects a disposition to enforce contracts freely entered. This 
disposition undermines contract law’s effectiveness in curtailing 
noncompetes and encourages employers to continue writing broad and even 
unenforceable noncompetes. 
Similarly, foundational principles of contract law focus on the shared 
intent of the contracting parties and consider third-party or broader social 
                                                      
146. Blake, supra note 2, at 640–41 (citing Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 
L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875)). 
147. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
148. See, e.g., Prod. Action Int’l, Inc. v. Mero, 277 F. Supp. 2d 919, 932 (S.D. Ind. 2003) 
(suggesting that the blue pencil doctrine was adopted because it facilitates courts upholding covenants 
not to compete); Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984) (suggesting 
that equitable reformation doctrine was adopted because it is consistent with contract law principles and 
upholds intentions of the parties better than nonenforcement); Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 
298 N.W.2d 127, 131 n.1 (Minn. 1980) (suggesting that the blue pencil doctrine was adopted because it 
enables courts to make changes to the terms of a noncompete without having to strike it down). 
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interests only reluctantly.149 In theory, contracts only affect the parties who 
sign them. However, employment noncompetes affect third-party and 
broader social interests in unusually significant ways. For example, they can 
prevent prospective employers from hiring desired workers and they 
deprive society of efficient labor markets. Employment noncompetes affect 
third-party interests and broader social interests in a way that contract law 
has difficulty taking into full account. In a dispute to uphold or set aside an 
employment noncompete, will prospective employers be allowed to 
intervene? What mechanisms does the public have to finance or encourage 
litigation opposing unlawful or excessive noncompetes?150 Even when 
third-party and public interests are significant and legitimate, contract law 
has difficulty fully accounting for them. 
Finally, contract law is reluctant to second-guess the adequacy of 
consideration or the fairness of substantive contract terms. As the 1858 case, 
Westlake v. Adams, states, “[i]t is an elementary principle that the law will 
not enter into an inquiry as to the adequacy of the consideration.”151 In the 
rare times when a typical contract fails for lack of consideration, the 
consideration is not merely inadequate or unfair, it is an “absurdity”152 or a 
“joke.”153 That a contract is valid even when one party to a contract might 
promise something valuable while the other party promises something far, 
far less valuable is so widely acknowledged that it is known as the 
“peppercorn theory” of consideration.154 However, contract law’s 
reluctance to second-guess the adequacy of consideration is difficult to 
reconcile with the requirement that noncompetes be reasonable. Even a 
narrowly-tailored restriction is unreasonable if the restricted party receives 
no or only de minimis value in exchange for enduring it. Thus, courts set 
aside employment noncompetes for lack of adequate consideration in a way 
                                                      
149. See, e.g., supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
150. The State Attorney General suit against Jimmy John’s is one example of publicly financed 
opposition to employment noncompetes, but these examples are rare. See supra notes 42–54 and 
accompanying text. 
151. Edmund Polubinski, Jr., The Peppercorn Theory and the Restatement of Contracts, 10 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 201, 201 (1968) (quoting Westlake v. Adams, 5 C.B. (N.S.) 248 (1858)). 
152. Id. (quoting White v. Bluett, 23 L.J. Ex. 36 (1834)). 
153. Id. (quoting Fischer v. Union Trust Co., 101 N.W. 852 (Mich. 1904)). 
154. Id. at 206.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
294 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:265 
 
 
 
they do not typically set aside other contracts.155 However, judicial 
reluctance to declare consideration inadequate or to second-guess the 
substantive fairness of contract terms likely prevents contract-law-based 
approaches from successfully curtailing employment noncompetes.  
B. Ignores Business Judgment 
While employment noncompetes are problematically overused, there 
may be instances in which an employment noncompete is a valuable and 
appropriate tool. For example, sophisticated prospective employees with 
meaningful access to legal counsel and vast employment opportunities may 
anticipate learning highly-sensitive information from prospective 
employers. They may wish to negotiate and sign noncompete agreements 
with prospective employers to encourage these prospective employers to 
hire and share protected information with them. Indeed, this is the context 
in which employment noncompetes began. While intellectual property 
rights might partially protect employers in these scenarios, their partial 
protection might not always be sufficient. “[I]n certain circumstances such 
[employment noncompete] covenants are necessary, largely because other 
legal remedies, although theoretically available, are relatively ineffective in 
practice.”156  
Unfortunately, contract law is ill-equipped to predefine the 
circumstances in which an employment noncompete is a valuable and 
appropriate tool. Unless it is willing to base all decisions on a vague 
standard—like the existing reasonableness standard—that has led to 
uncertainty and an overuse of employment noncompetes, contract law faces 
the formidable challenge of predefining when employment noncompetes 
should be allowed and with what terms. Should we uphold employment 
noncompetes for workers whose compensation exceeds a certain threshold? 
What about founders who are paid primarily in stock? Should we uphold 
employment noncompetes for workers who are in certain designated 
management positions? What about managers who access only public 
information? What about non-managers who research and develop new 
products? 
For reasons that courts have articulated in cases involving the business 
judgment rule, courts are less capable at making difficult strategic business 
decisions than are businesses themselves.157 It is not surprising, therefore, 
                                                      
155. See, e.g., Wilder v. John Youngblood Motors, Inc., 534 S.W.3d 902, 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2017). 
156. Blake, supra note 2, at 691. 
157. See, e.g., Brock Built, LLC v. Blake, 686 S.E.2d 425, 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he 
business judgment rule is a policy of judicial restraint born of the recognition that [business people] are, 
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that “[t]here have been many cases of gross misuse of [employment 
noncompete] covenants in the past, in part because of the failure of many 
courts to engage in a discriminating analysis of their impact before 
enforcing them.”158 Rather than a judicial determination or a policymaker’s 
guess, the best evidence that a particular employment noncompete is 
appropriate and justified would be if the employer and the employee agreed 
to it, if each has full knowledge of all relevant facts, and if each must bear 
the costs of an overly broad or otherwise unreasonable noncompete. Under 
current law, employers do not bear these costs. However, if they are made 
to bear them—for example through a rule (like the one proposed in this 
Article) that makes it more expensive for them to impose overly broad 
noncompetes or to impose noncompetes on an overly broad set of 
employees, then the business judgment of employers and employees can 
better approximate an efficient outcome. Contract law forfeits the potential 
benefit of business judgment and requires that either a blanket rule (like a 
statutory prohibition on enforcing noncompetes) or an ambiguous and 
uncertain standard (like the judicially-imposed reasonableness standard) 
attempt to approximate efficient outcomes.  
C. Relies on Private Enforcement 
When employment noncompetes are overly broad or otherwise 
unenforceable, the employees covered by them are often unaware of their 
unenforceability. Thus, they abide by them rather than ignoring them or 
challenging them in court.159 Further, as the stories of Amazon and Jimmy 
John’s hint, employers using noncompetes may be less interested—or even 
disinterested—in their legal enforceability. They may be more interested in 
                                                      
in most cases, more qualified to make business decisions than are judges.”) (quoting In re The Bal 
Harbour Club, 316 F.3d 1192, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
158. Blake, supra note 2, at 691. 
159. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at 24 
(“[W]orkers are often poorly informed about the existence and details of their non-competes, as well as 
the relevant legal implications. Some employers appear to be exploiting this lack of understanding in 
ways that harm workers without producing corresponding benefits to society.”); Prescott, Bishara & 
Starr, supra note 1, at 462 (“Employees seem much less likely to be aware of governing noncompete 
law, and may believe that all contractual language is enforceable.”). 
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their potential to chill pro-competitive behavior by their current and former 
employees.160  
Since contract law depends on private enforcement by current and former 
employees, and since these potential private enforcers are often ill-equipped 
to challenge overly broad or otherwise unenforceable noncompetes, 
employers are left with an insufficiently checked incentive to use 
noncompetes excessively. Thus, they write overly broad noncompetes and 
impose them on an overly broad population of employees. 
Unfortunately, contract law’s reliance on private enforcement also 
worsens the distributional harms of employment noncompetes. As one of 
the researchers of the Noncompete Survey Project, Evan Starr, explains,  
People who have high education levels, who are making lots of 
money — they’re pretty confident about whether they signed [an 
employment noncompete] or not . . . . But people who are relatively 
low-skilled, people with, let’s say, a high school degree or less, or 
people who earn less than $40,000 — they’re very unsure.161  
Employees, and especially lower-income employees, usually have 
incomplete information about whether they signed an employment 
noncompete, what its terms mean, and whether its terms are enforceable.  
Brendan Lynch, an attorney for Community Legal Services of 
Philadelphia, says his low-income clients usually have no idea that 
they agreed to a noncompete clause. They find out after they’ve left 
a company, when their ex-employer slaps them with a court order or 
sends a threatening message to a prospective future employer. . . . 
Lynch says the noncompete agreements he sees are often written too 
broadly and wouldn’t survive a lawsuit. But most workers obey initial 
threats rather than going to court over them, he said. “I think there 
are people who have been affected by this, and it doesn’t even occur 
to them to get a lawyer.”162  
The director of a public interest law firm established to represent home care 
and hospice workers, William Dombi, agrees. To employers “[t]he strength 
is in the deterrence, rather than the enforcement.”163 
                                                      
160. OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at 25 (“Many firms write 
non-compete contracts that contain unenforceable, overbroad provisions. Given the well-documented 
worker confusion about these contracts and the very low cost of writing an unenforceable contract, 
employers can exert a chilling effect on worker behavior even when their contracts are unenforceable.”). 
161. Quinton, supra note 11. 
162. Id.  
163. Id.  
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Employers are often aware of employee confusion regarding 
noncompete enforceability and exploit it. As the U.S. Department of 
Treasury explains,  
Several pieces of evidence suggest that employers are relying on 
workers’ incomplete understanding of non-compete agreements. 
First, employers often require that workers sign non-compete 
agreements even in states that refuse to enforce them. For example, 
in California, which (with limited exceptions) does not enforce non-
compete agreements, the fraction of workers currently under a non-
compete is 19 percent, which is slightly higher than the national 
average.164 
Contract law approaches have failed, in large part, because employees who 
sign unenforceable noncompetes are often unaware of their 
unenforceability. Thus, they abide by them, rather than ignoring them or 
seeking to set them aside. This makes them insufficiently effective private 
enforcers of contract-law-based restrictions on noncompetes. Recognizing 
this, employers persist in writing broader noncompetes and in applying 
noncompetes to broader populations of employees, unconcerned with the 
matter of whether they are legally enforceable contracts.165 
D. Employer-Friendly Judicial Doctrines 
In the rare instances when employees challenge unenforceable 
noncompete agreements in court, they are often disappointed. Judicial 
doctrines regarding unenforceable noncompetes strongly favor employers 
and encourage employers to continue using unenforceable noncompetes. 
                                                      
164. OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at 12. 
165. See Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 1, at 462–63 (“One possible interpretation—which 
we only suggest here—is that actual enforceability may be unimportant to parties; instead, perceived 
enforceability on the part of employees is what is critical, and the actual content of the law may have 
little relationship to what employees perceive. Indeed, employers may misinform employees simply by 
asking them to sign a noncompete, which is something they may be more likely to do whenever there is 
a chance that an employee might view it as binding, or perhaps even a chance that the employee will 
subsequently view it as a promise or other expressive device that will likely improve the relationship.”) 
(footnotes omitted); see also supra notes 26, 30, & 31 and accompanying text (showing that employment 
noncompetes are very common, and are becoming more common). 
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These doctrines likely reflect the tensions, described previously, between 
actions to set aside employment noncompetes and foundational contract law 
principles.166 
In some instances, courts’ friendly treatment of even unenforceable 
noncompete agreements comes in the form of reformation (aka equitable 
reform), and in other instances, it comes in the form of the blue-pencil 
doctrine. The reformation doctrine prevails in most states167 and directs 
courts to rewrite unenforceable terms in a noncompete agreement to make 
them enforceable. Courts in reformation states will go so far as to insert new 
provisions, drafted sua sponte or suggested by the employer, to render an 
otherwise defective employment noncompete “non-defective.”168 Courts in 
blue-pencil states are nearly as eager to uphold noncompetes. They will 
“delete [only those specific words or provisions] of a non-compete contract 
that render it overbroad or otherwise defective” in order to save and enforce 
the rest of the previously unenforceable noncompete agreement.169 Given 
that employees rarely seek to set aside unenforceable employment 
noncompetes, often abide by unenforceable terms while litigation is 
pending, and reasonably anticipate that courts will bend over backwards to 
enforce unenforceable noncompete agreements to the greatest extent 
possible, it is no surprise that noncompetes have become more common 
despite contract-law based attempts to curtail them. 
E. Empirical Evidence of Failures 
Regardless of why contract law has failed—whether it is because efforts 
to curtail noncompetes using contract law (a) are in tension with 
fundamental principles of contract law, (b) ignore business judgment, 
(c) rely on private enforcers who lack capacity or sufficient motive to bring 
meritorious cases, or (d) trigger judicial doctrines that are too friendly 
toward and insufficiently punitive of unenforceable noncompetes—the 
important conclusion is that it has failed.170  
                                                      
166. See supra note 148 (listing decisions from various states in which judges explained that they 
adopted blue pencil and equitable reformation doctrines to uphold contract law principles).  
167. Beck Reed Riden LLP, supra note 114 (showing that most of the fifty states use the 
reformation doctrine of judicially rewriting unenforceable noncompetes to make them enforceable).  
168. OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at 14.  
169. Id. 
170. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of 
Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 751, 780 (2011) (observing “a measurable drift of the aggregate policies in the United States toward 
greater enforcement”); Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee 
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 
122–48 (2008) (observing trend in state statutes and common law toward upholding more restrictive 
covenants). 
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After completing the largest study of U.S. employment noncompetes, 
researchers J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara, and Evan Starr present their 
initial and most important finding:  
We find little evidence that the incidence of noncompetition 
agreements in a state (after controlling for potentially confounding 
factors) has any relationship to the level of enforcement of such 
agreements in that state. In other words, an employee in California 
(where noncompetes are prohibited) appears to be just as likely to 
labor under a noncompete as an employee in Florida (where 
noncompetes are much more likely to be enforced).171  
As they detail,  
While our work is preliminary, to our eyes, the pattern that emerges 
is relatively stark . . . . [C]onsiderable variation in the enforceability 
of noncompetes across states exists, and yet the incidence of these 
contracts does not appear to vary across diverse enforcement regimes. 
On average, across all quintiles, about 18% of labor force participants 
are bound by noncompetition agreement. . . . Non-enforcing states 
like California and North Dakota, for instance, have an estimated 
noncompete incidence of approximately 19.3%, which is actually 
higher than the corresponding level for every enforceability quintile 
(the highest enforcing quintile has an incidence of 19.0%).  
Importantly, if we consider other observable information about 
respondents—such as age, occupation, and industry—in a regression 
framework, the substance of the resulting pattern does not change.172 
Indeed, these findings cause the authors of the study to worry that since past 
legal reform efforts to curtail noncompetes have failed, future efforts may 
be futile.  
[B]ecause our findings suggest that the status quo legal regime in a 
state may not matter on the ground (at least in terms of incidence 
levels), policymakers should be wary of presuming that black-letter-
                                                      
171. Prescott, Bishara, & Starr, supra note 1, at 370 (emphasis added). 
172. Id. at 460–61 (emphasis omitted). 
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law reform can be a useful tool to change employer practices. The 
fact that the frequency of noncompetes in a state appears unrelated to 
the governing legal regime does not necessarily imply there is also 
no relationship between noncompete law and employee behavior and 
outcomes. Even so, our finding does raise the specter that, at some 
basic level, reflexively curtailing or banning noncompetition 
agreements in something like the California mold may accomplish 
much less than many scholars, commentators, and policymakers 
currently imagine.173 
This Author is similarly pessimistic that contract-law-based reforms can 
make a meaningful dent in the prevalence of employment noncompetes. But 
this Author is much more optimistic that “black-letter-law reform can be a 
useful tool to change employer practices,” provided a wholly novel 
approach is taken. No efforts—at either state or federal levels—have been 
taken to use a tax-law-based approach to reform. Yet a tax law route holds 
the potential of more effectively curtailing employment noncompetes than 
the relentlessly but unsuccessfully pursued route of contract law. 
F. But Contract Law Offers a Hint to Tax Law 
Even though contract law has largely failed to curtail the damaging, 
excessive, and exploitative use of employment noncompetes, contract-law-
based challenges have caused courts across the nation and across the ages 
to make findings that offer a hint to tax law. When presented with claims by 
employees that the employment noncompetes they seek to set aside are 
unsupported by adequate consideration, courts consistently agree with 
employers. Courts find that the consideration necessary to make an 
employment noncompete enforceable is provided in the form of employee 
compensation.  
Courts agree with employers when they claim that they adequately 
compensate employees for noncompete restrictions with enhanced 
employment benefits. Employers have successfully argued that an 
employer’s action to hire an employee,174 to retain an at-will employee,175 
                                                      
173. Id. at 463 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
174. See, e.g., Beta LaserMike, Inc. v. Swinchatt, No. 18059, 2000 WL 262628, at *5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 10, 2000) (“[A]dequate consideration has been provided in the form of the employment 
itself.”).  
175. See, e.g., id. (“[C]ontinued employment of an at-will employee provides adequate 
consideration for a noncompete agreement.”); Coastal Unilube, Inc. v. Smith, 598 So.2d 200, 201 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (same); JumboSack Corp. v. Buyck, 407 S.W.3d 51, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (same). 
But see supra note 120 (listing states that require separately-stated consideration). 
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to promote an employee,176 to pay a salary to an employee,177 to award a 
raise to an employee,178 to pay a bonus to an employee,179 to grant stock 
options to an employee,180 or otherwise to provide or increase compensation 
to an employee181 constitutes adequate consideration for a noncompete. In 
each of these cases, the consideration for a noncompete is employment 
compensation that the employer pays the employee. For example, the 
Mississippi case of Frierson v. Sheppard Building Supply Co.182 involved 
an employee who earned $450 per month plus bonuses for his work as a 
manager. After he was discharged by his employer and began a competitive 
business, his former employer sought to enforce an employment 
noncompete agreement. In the resulting contract dispute, the court found 
that the noncompete was supported by adequate consideration, explaining 
that if the employee  
had been discharged shortly after signing the restrictive agreement, 
this Court would probably hold the agreement was not supported by 
consideration. But [employee] was not discharged until more than 
four years had elapsed during which time [employee] had drawn as 
salary and bonuses about $200,000. Thus, the actual continuation of 
                                                      
176. See, e.g., PartyLite Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1221–22 (M.D. Fla. 2012) 
(finding that employee’s promotion from Consultant to Leader constitutes adequate compensation for 
an employment noncompete); Softchoice, Inc. v. Schmidt, 763 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“[A] promotion serves as consideration for a non-compete agreement . . . . when the promotion provides 
the employee with ‘real advantages.’”). 
177. See, e.g., Digitel Corp. v. Deltacom, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1486, 1496 (M.D. Ala. 1996) 
(“[C]ontinued employment and compensation in return for a promise not to compete constitutes 
consideration.”) (quoting Corson v. Univ. Door Sys., Inc., 596 So.2d 565, 568 (Ala. 1991)). 
178. See, e.g., Mail-Well Envelope Co. v. Saley, 497 P.2d 364, 367 (Or. 1972) (“[I]ncrease [in 
pay] from $500 to $550 per month, plus the payment of commissions by which he was able to so 
substantially increase his earnings, constituted substantial new and additional consideration so as to 
make the [employment noncompete] contract . . . legally valid . . . .”) 
179. See, e.g., PartyLite Gifts, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (finding that payment of 
bonuses through the employer’s “Profit Plus Program” constituted consideration for employment 
noncompete). 
180. See, e.g., Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 F. Supp. 2d 973, 979 (D. Ariz. 2006) (“[T]he 
consideration for the grant of stock options was the promise not to compete . . . .”). 
181. See, e.g., Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co. v. Bredeson, 437 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989) (“Economic and professional benefits are sufficient consideration to support subsequent 
noncompetition agreements.”). 
182. 154 So.2d 151 (Miss. 1963). 
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employment and the receipt by [employee] of these large sums of 
money as compensation therefor, supplied any lack of 
consideration.183  
Implicit in the court’s finding that salary and bonuses of $200,000 supplied 
consideration for the employment noncompete is a finding that at least part 
of the salary and bonuses were exchanged for the employment noncompete. 
Thus, only the remaining part, or some amount less than $200,000, should 
therefore be seen as compensation for current labor.  
III. CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF NONCOMPETES 
The current tax treatment of a noncompete depends on the context in 
which the noncompete is acquired. It turns on whether the noncompete is 
acquired from a business seller as part of a business purchase, from a non-
employee, or from an employee. Although the first two contexts are not the 
subject of this Article, it is useful to consider how tax law treats 
noncompetes when they are acquired from a business seller or other non-
employee because these rules provide a useful contrast to tax law’s current 
treatment of employment noncompetes. This contrast exposes that, while 
employment noncompetes are the most common and most harmful form of 
noncompetes,184 tax law has carelessly allowed them to be treated as 
inconsistent outliers. 
When a noncompete is acquired as part of a business purchase, such as 
when the seller of a business agrees not to compete with the buyer of that 
business, the buyer amortizes the value of the noncompete185 over the fifteen 
years following the business purchase regardless of the noncompete’s 
term.186 When a noncompete is acquired by a separate payment to the 
restrained party not in connection with the purchase of a business, generally 
it is amortized over the noncompete’s term.187 In both instances, the 
                                                      
183. Id. at 154. 
184. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (estimating that 18%—or nearly one in five—
American workers is currently covered by an employment noncompete); infra note 189 (explaining why 
employment noncompetes are most harmful). 
185. For simplicity purposes, this sentence has assumed that the business sale was an arm’s-length 
transaction and thus assumes that the cost agreed to for the business sale reflected its value. Because the 
amortization period for all § 197 intangibles is fifteen years, the aggregate value of all § 197 intangibles 
is amortized over fifteen years and there is no need to establish separate values for noncompetes or other 
§ 197 intangibles.  
186. 26 U.S.C. § 197(a), (d)(1)(E) (2016). 
187. See, e.g., Recovery Grp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1324, 1327 (2010) (“A covenant 
not to compete is an intangible asset that, unlike goodwill, does have a limited useful life, defined in the 
terms of the covenant; and [if it is separately acquired from a non-employee] the cost of obtaining such 
a covenant is, therefore, amortizable ratably over the life of the covenant . . .”).  
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noncompete is treated as an intangible asset acquired by the purchaser. In 
neither instance is it treated as immediately deductible.188  
That forms of noncompetes other than employment noncompetes are 
capitalized is interesting because they begin wasting immediately and they 
tend to be less exploitative and less socially harmful than employment 
noncompetes.189 This contrast makes it even more surprising that 
employment noncompetes alone are not capitalized and amortized. Instead, 
and apparently without much attention, employers immediately deduct the 
compensation that they pay to their employees in exchange for noncompetes 
regardless of the noncompete’s term and regardless of when that term 
begins.  
A. Employers Quietly, and Without Resistance, Immediately Deduct 
Payments for Employment Noncompetes 
When employers immediately deduct the full amount of compensation 
they pay to employees who are subject to noncompetes, they take a position 
in tax law that cannot be reconciled with the position they take in contract 
law. They claim in tax law that they provide no compensation for the 
noncompete and thus that all compensation they pay is immediately 
deductible. They claim in contract law that they provide compensation for 
the noncompete, which forms the consideration necessary to make it a valid 
and enforceable contract that complies with the reasonableness 
requirements imposed by most state courts. By admitting that the 
                                                      
188. Note, however, that capitalization is only required if the payment for the covenant not to 
compete exceeds a $5,000 de minimis amount and fails the 12-month rule. Payments below a $5,000 de 
minimis amount can be immediately deducted. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(6)(vii), Ex. 6 
(2003) (explaining that party that pays $100,000 in exchange for three-year covenant not to compete 
“must capitalize the entire $100,000 payment” because payment is not de minimis). Similarly, payments 
for noncompetes that last no longer than twelve months from when they begin and no longer than the 
end of the year following the year of payment can be immediately deducted according to the “12-month 
rule” of Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(1). See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(l), Ex. 3 (explaining that party that 
pays $25,000 to a departing key employee in exchange for a covenant not to compete that begins 
immediately upon payment and “for a period of 9 months” may be deducted since it satisfies the 12-
month rule). If neither the de minimis rule nor the 12-month rule permits immediate deduction, then the 
noncompete must be amortized over its term according to Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2003). 
189. See supra note 5 (citing cases explaining why employment noncompetes are usually more 
exploitative than other types of noncompetes). 
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compensation they pay to their employees is at least partially consideration 
for their employees being subject to employment noncompete agreements, 
employers admit that the compensation they pay to their employees is at 
least partially in exchange for future benefits. Thus, they admit that they 
should not be allowed to fully immediately deduct all compensation and 
instead should be required to amortize a portion of compensation over the 
future period in which they will receive the benefits of the noncompete 
agreement.  
Unfortunately, the IRS has not challenged employers when they violate 
tax law by fully immediately deducting all compensation they pay to 
employees subject to noncompete agreements. Indeed, an extensive search 
for cases or IRS publications in which the IRS argued that a portion of 
compensation should not be immediately deducted because it compensates 
for an employment noncompete turned up no authorities. The IRS has not 
asserted that any portion of compensation should be allocated to a 
noncompete and amortized over its restricted period, beginning when 
employment ends. Instead, it has allowed full immediate deduction of 
compensation paid to employees subject to noncompetes. 
It is possible that the IRS’s failure to require taxpayers to allocate 
adequate values to noncompetes is partly an accident grounded in history. 
Value allocated to a noncompete generally is amortizable, meaning that it 
is recovered gradually. Currently, a taxpayer prefers to have no value 
allocated to a noncompete since in the employment noncompete context, 
the alternative is for all value to be allocated to compensation for current 
labor and immediately deducted. However, prior to the 1993 passage of § 
197, the IRS litigated many business-sale noncompete cases, where the 
allocation question presented differently. Prior to § 197, taxpayers who 
purchased businesses had to determine what amount of the aggregate 
purchase price should be allocated to the seller’s noncompete (which would 
be amortized over the noncompete’s term) and what amount should be 
allocated to goodwill. Taxpayers did not want value allocated to goodwill 
because value allocated to goodwill was recovered only upon the taxpayer’s 
eventual sale of the business. So instead, they sought to allocate as much 
value as possible to the noncompete. In response, the IRS routinely argued 
that less value should be allocated to the noncompete so that more value 
would be allocated to goodwill. The case law from this period shows the 
IRS resisting excessive allocations of value to noncompetes.190  
                                                      
190. See, e.g., Ill. Cereal Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1001, 1021 (1983) (showing 
IRS’s resistance to the allocation of business purchase price to noncompete from former business owner 
and establishing high burdens of proof to support any such allocation: “[t]o be entitled to amortize a 
covenant not to compete, a taxpayer must show: (1) that the covenant had independent economic 
significance such that we might conclude that it was a bargained-for element of the agreement; and (2) 
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However, the passage of § 197 mooted business-sale noncompete cases 
by eliminating the need to allocate business purchase prices between 
noncompetes and goodwill.191 Since then, the question of what value to 
allocate to a noncompete presents192 overwhelmingly in employment 
noncompete cases. In employment noncompete cases, the alternative to 
amortization is not worse (cost recovery upon resale); rather, it is better 
(immediate deduction). Thus, predictably, taxpayers do not voluntarily 
allocate any value to employment noncompetes. Unfortunately, the IRS has 
not changed its strategy to challenge employers when they allocate 
insufficient value to noncompetes. To the contrary, its rhetoric continues to 
evidence an unhelpful skepticism that noncompetes can have substantial 
value or that their value should be treated differently from compensation for 
current labor.  
For example, in the employment noncompete case, Leste v. 
Commissioner,193 the IRS attempted to recharacterize payments made 
“pursuant to a consulting and noncompetition agreement” as additional 
consideration for the purchase of the consultant’s stock, which would have 
been capitalized.194 The IRS lost this recharacterization argument. However, 
importantly, neither the IRS nor the Tax Court distinguished between 
payments for current consulting labor and for noncompete restrictions. The 
court held that the  
monthly fee paid to [consultant] constitutes reasonable compensation 
                                                      
that the parties considered the covenant as a valuable part of the entire consideration for the agreement”); 
Levinson v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 380, 389 (1966) (same); see also Patterson v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 
670 (1985) (prohibiting allocation of value to a noncompete when the business purchase and sale 
agreement did not include such an allocation). 
191. H.R. REP. NO. 102-631, at 210 (1992) (“It is believed that much of the controversy that arises 
under present law with respect to acquired intangible assets could be eliminated by specifying a single 
method and period for recovering the cost of most acquired intangible assets and by treating acquired 
goodwill and going concern value as amortizable intangible assets. . . . Accordingly, the bill requires the 
cost of most acquired intangible assets, including goodwill and going concern value, to be amortized 
ratably over a [fifteen]-year period.”). 
192. It would be more accurate to say that this issue “should present” overwhelmingly in 
employment noncompete cases. It does not present in these cases because the IRS does not challenge 
employers when they allocate no value to a noncompete and immediately deduct all compensation paid 
to employees subject to noncompetes. 
193. 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1005 (1996). 
194. Id. at 1006. 
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for both the consulting services component and the covenant not to 
compete . . . . Consequently, we hold that . . . [employer] is entitled 
to deduct all of the payments made to [consultant] pursuant to the 
consulting and noncompetition agreement entered between those 
parties.195  
Unfortunately, by treating payments for consulting labor and for 
noncompete restrictions as the same, and both as immediately deductible, 
the IRS and the Tax Court ignored that noncompete restrictions are 
primarily associated with future benefits.  
It is also possible that the IRS’s failure to require taxpayers to allocate 
adequate value to noncompetes is the result of a simplifying convention run 
amok. From 2000 until 2002, the Tax Court properly denied several 
employers’ requests to fully, immediately deduct compensation that they 
paid to employees in the process of obtaining long-term intangible assets, 
including multiyear loan contracts.196 Unfortunately, its rulings were 
reversed on appeal. Instead of continuing to fight for capitalization of the 
employee compensation costs of acquiring long-term intangibles, the IRS 
gave up, self-imposed a simplifying convention, and allowed these costs to 
be deducted. The IRS released an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
suggesting that “to minimize uncertainty and to ease the administrative 
burden of accounting for transaction costs . . . [,] the rules could allow a 
deduction for all employee compensation” to obtain long-term 
intangibles.197 Reacting to these and similar proposed rules, tax scholars 
warned that  
The Treasury Department seems to have lost its intellectual and moral 
compass with these proposed regulations. Tax base is squandered by 
the mile and with ease by the Treasury, but it can be replaced only by 
inches and with Herculean effort. A strong tax base is an inheritance 
that needs to be preserved and improved. Only the Treasury 
                                                      
195. Id. at 1010. The holding of Leste is less problematic than its unqualified language because 
payments made pursuant to the consulting and noncompete agreement were made monthly and 
consulting services were provided over the same period as the restricted period. See also C.H. Robinson, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M (CCH) 969 (1998) (holding that amount paid for a covenant not to compete 
was an immediately deductible business expense); Kalamazoo Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 693 F.2d 618 (6th 
Cir. 1982) (holding that payments were not an immediately deductible business expense because they 
were not for a covenant not to compete); Taylor v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1332 (1992) (holding 
that payments for a covenant not to compete and consulting agreement were deductible by the employer 
as ordinary and necessary business expenses). 
196. See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 349 (1998), rev’d, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Norwest Corp. v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 89 (1999), rev’d in part sub nom. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 
224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000); Lychuk v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 374 (2001). 
197. Blasius v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 274, 277 (2005) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461, 3464 (proposed 
Jan. 24, 2002)). 
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Department can protect our tax base. The secular, even sacred duty 
of the Treasury Department is to defend and strengthen the tax base 
against those who every day would destroy it, and these regulations 
are a breach of that duty.198 
Unfortunately, even though the simplifying convention allowing immediate 
deduction of employee compensation paid to acquire long-term intangibles 
would destroy significant tax base, causing less tax revenue to be collected, 
the IRS began following this simplifying convention even before it was 
finalized as part of the so-called INDOPCO regulations,199 discussed in 
Section III.B, below. “On March 15, 2002, [the IRS] issued Chief Counsel 
Notice (CCN) 2002-21, in which the Chief Counsel announced that the IRS 
would no longer ‘assert capitalization under section 263(a) for employee 
compensation . . . related to the acquisition, creation, or enhancement of 
intangible assets or benefits.’”200  
Since this simplifying convention was effectively self-imposed by the 
IRS after cases involving multiyear loan contracts, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the IRS intended for it to apply to intangible assets that begin 
wasting immediately. However, it is now being used in a way that likely 
was not intended. When employers deduct the compensation they pay to 
acquire an employment noncompete, they deduct a cost that does not even 
begin wasting until years after payment, when the employment relationship 
ends, and the restricted period begins. 
Whether the IRS’s lack of resistance to an employer’s full, immediate 
deduction of employee compensation paid to acquire an employment 
noncompete is grounded in a historical accident or a simplifying convention 
run amok, the critical point is that the IRS has not resisted. Since employers 
prefer to immediately deduct all compensation they pay to employees 
subject to noncompetes and since the IRS has not challenged this full 
                                                      
198. Calvin Johnson, Destroying Tax Base: The Proposed INDOPCO Capitalization Regulations, 
99 TAX NOTES 1381, 1382 (2003). 
199. Blasius, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) at 277 (observing that the Chief Counsel Notice of March 15, 
2002 predated by several months Treasury’s December 19, 2002 issuance of proposed regulations under 
section 263(a) [the INDOPCO regulations] that “also permit a deduction in the year incurred for all 
‘compensation paid to employees (including bonuses and commissions paid to employees)’” to “create 
or enhance an intangible asset”). 
200. Id. 
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immediate deduction, it is not surprising that case law is sparse on the tax 
treatment of employment noncompetes. Our adversarial system is not good 
at exposing errors when neither party to a dispute raises the issue. 
Interestingly, however, one of the rare statements about the tax treatment of 
employment noncompetes shows how quietly this error has been allowed to 
lie.  
In the Tax Court Memorandum opinion, Winter v. Commissioner,201 Tax 
Court Judge Holmes hinted that the IRS might not be properly addressing 
the tax treatment of employment noncompetes. And then quickly dropped 
the issue. All in a footnote.202  
The facts of Winter are more complicated than a straight-forward 
employment noncompete in which an employer pays compensation to an 
employee subject to a noncompete and immediately deducts it in full, 
effectively ignoring the future benefit that the noncompete will produce. 
Instead, the case primarily depended on other potential future benefits and 
other potential timing questions.  
In Winter, a bank employee received a $5.1 million prepayment of a five-
year bonus in 2002. The employee (Winter), the employer (the bank), and 
the IRS all agreed that $1.1 million of the bonus was earned in 2002, and $4 
million was a prepayment of amounts expected to be earned from 2003 
through 2006.203 Thus, at the time of the prepayment, $1.1 million was 
immediately deductible and $4 million was amortizable over the period 
benefitted, from 2003 through 2006. However, things did not go as planned. 
Before the close of the 2002 tax year, the bank fired the employee and 
demanded that he return the $4 million prepayment portion of the bonus.204 
He refused and invoked a provision in his employment contract that 
converted prepaid bonuses into severance payments in the event of firing.205  
As to the tax treatment of the $4 million, the court applied tax law’s 
contested liability rules to conclude that the employer could immediately 
deduct the $4 million because, prior to the close of the 2002 tax year, it had 
been converted from an amortizable bonus prepayment into an immediately 
deductible severance payment.206 Thus, the employer could deduct the full 
$5.1 million in 2002, including a $1.1 million earned bonus and a $4 million 
earned severance payment. 
                                                      
201. 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 604 (2010). 
202. Id. at 609 n.11. 
203. Id. The implication is that the bonus was $5.5 million for five years, or $1.1 million per year. 
However, $5.1 million was prepaid to reflect a discounted present value of the $5.5 million over five 
years. Id. 
204. Id.  
205. Id. 
206. Id.  
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What is most interesting about Winter is what happens in footnote 11. In 
footnote 11, the Tax Court sua sponte raises an issue that is central to the 
thesis of this Article. It states,  
It’s possible that the employment agreement would benefit [the 
employer] beyond 2002 via two restrictive covenants [. . . 
including207] a one-year covenant not to compete following Winter’s 
termination. But it’s not clear from the contract what portion, if any, 
of Winter’s compensation was in consideration for these covenants, 
or if the covenants offer more than an incidental benefit.208  
Unfortunately, the Tax Court was alone in spotting the critical issue that the 
$5.1 million compensation was still associated with a future benefit (even 
after it ceased to be a prepaid bonus) because it compensated for a 
noncompete that extended beyond 2002.  
Had the IRS raised this issue, the Tax Court could have found that the 
portion of compensation allocable to the noncompete was nondeductible 
and, instead, was amortizable over the restricted period. Instead, the IRS 
failed to allocate any value to the noncompete and failed to invoke burden 
of proof rules that would have required the taxpayer to propose and support 
such an allocation. Thus, the IRS presented the Tax Court with an 
incomplete factual record.  
Winter’s footnote 11 states the problem plainly.  
Both parties [the IRS and the taxpayer] implicitly value [the future 
benefits associated with the employment noncompete] at zero. The 
Commissioner argues that [the employer] properly deducted the first 
$1.1 million in 2002 because Winter had provided one-fifth of the 
total services—this can only be true if none of the $5.5 million is 
allocated to the covenants. Winter also ignores the covenants by 
arguing that the full payment should be deducted in 2002 as part 
compensation and part severance. [The failure to allocate any value 
to the noncompete] isn’t a jurisdictional argument, so we won’t make 
                                                      
207. The second covenant was a confidentiality and loyalty clause not relevant to this argument. 
208. Id. at 609 n.11 (citations omitted). 
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an argument for the parties that they do not make for themselves.209 
When the IRS fails to assert that an employment noncompete provides 
benefits that an employer will receive in future years (from when the 
employment relationship ends until the restricted period ends), require an 
adequate allocation of value to those future benefits, or otherwise challenge 
an employer when it immediately deducts the full compensation it pays to 
an employee subject to a noncompete, it prevents courts from properly 
enforcingtax law. It enables employment noncompetes to thrive. Worse, it 
means that employment noncompetes receive an unfairly preferential—and 
unexamined—tax benefit. To put it bluntly, the IRS subsidizes harmful 
restrictions on the employment mobility and opportunities of thirty million 
American workers.  
B. Violates Expense vs. Expenditure 
When employers immediately deduct the full compensation they pay to 
employees subject to noncompetes, they violate tax law. Most importantly, 
they violate tax law’s fundamental distinction between trade or business 
expenses, which are fully and immediately deductible,210 and prepayments 
or other expenditures,211 which are not. When applied to compensation, this 
distinction means that employers can immediately deduct the compensation 
they pay to their employees when it is an expense that compensates for labor 
that produces benefits enjoyed entirely within the year of payment.212 
However, they cannot immediately deduct the compensation they pay to 
their employees when it is a prepayment or other expenditure that produces 
significant benefits beyond the year of payment.213 
The United States Supreme Court required an employer to capitalize 
employee compensation that produced long-term benefits in Commissioner 
v. Idaho Power Co.214 The Court ruled that compensation cannot be 
                                                      
209. Id. 
210. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2017). 
211. SAMUEL A. DONALDSON & DONALD B. TOBIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH 209 (2d ed. 2012). While the term “expenses” is not defined in Section 162, other Code 
provisions (including Sections 263A and 263a establishing that certain outlays are expenditures rather 
than expenses) and extensive case law establishes that expenses are outlays other than expenditures and 
that expenditures “are those costs that provide a long-term benefit to the taxpayer.” Id. 
212. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (2017) (specifically authorizing immediate deduction for “a 
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered”). 
213. DONALDSON & TOBIN, supra note 211, at 212 (“[O]nly expenses are deductible under 162 . 
. . . Expenses are distinct from capital expenditures. The latter create or add to basis and cannot be 
deducted in the year paid or incurred. In some cases, capital expenditures are deducted over time in the 
form of deductions for depreciation and amortization . . . In other cases, capital expenditures are 
recovered only when the taxpayer disposes of the particular asset created or improved by the capital 
expenditure.”). 
214. 418 U.S. 1 (1974). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2018] NONCOMPETES AS TAX EVASION 311 
 
 
 
 
deducted, and instead must be capitalized, when it is paid to employees to 
construct a building that will benefit the employer beyond the year of 
payment.215 As the Court explained, “when wages are paid in connection 
with the construction or acquisition of a capital asset, they must be 
capitalized and are then entitled to be amortized [or depreciated] over the 
life of the capital asset so acquired.”216  
The Court reasoned that, when a taxpayer pays compensation to acquire 
a lasting asset, the payment is not expended; rather, it is “assimilated into 
the cost of the capital asset constructed.”217 While Idaho Power involved 
compensation paid to acquire a tangible capital asset, its reasoning applies 
similarly when compensation is paid to acquire an intangible asset.218  
The Supreme Court has not just required capitalization of compensation 
paid to acquire lasting tangible and intangible assets,219 it has required 
capitalization of compensation paid to acquire lasting intangible benefits. In 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,220 the taxpayer faced the prospect of a 
                                                      
215. Id. at 19. The holding of Idaho Power has since been codified in 26 U.S.C. § 263A, otherwise 
known as the Uniform Capitalization Rules. 
216. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 13 (citing Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm’r, 475 F.2d 775, 781 
(2d Cir. 1973); Perlmutter v. Comm’r, 44 T.C. 382, 404 (1965), aff’d, 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967); 
Jaffa v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 234, 236 (N.D. Ohio 1961); Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(e)). 
217. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 14. 
218. See, e.g., FMR Corp. v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 402, 417 (1998) (requiring capitalization of 
compensation paid in the process of creating regulated investment companies); Lychuk v. Comm’r, 116 
T.C. 374, 398 (2001) (requiring capitalization of compensation paid in the process of evaluating and 
acquiring multi-year installment contracts). But see supra note 196 and accompanying text for negative 
subsequent treatment of these cases.  
219. The case to capitalize and amortize the value of a noncompete over its restricted period is 
strong because a noncompete is a separate and distinct intangible asset with a determinable useful life. 
See Recovery Grp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1324, 1327 (2010) (“A covenant not to compete 
is an intangible asset that . . . [has] a limited useful life, defined in the terms of the covenant.”). But see 
Johnson, supra note 198, at 1383 (arguing that difference between separate and distinct intangible assets 
and lasting intangible benefits is immaterial because, for accounting purposes, basis is an asset, so an 
asset may be created on a business’s accounting books for the purpose of tracking basis); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(3) (establishing current requirement that a separate and distinct intangible asset be 
“subject to protection under . . . law” and “intrinsically capable of being sold, transferred or pledged . . 
. separate and apart from a trade or business”). 
220. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). See also Metrocorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 211, 221–22 (2001) 
(“When an expense does not create [a separate and distinct] asset, the most critical factors to consider in 
passing on the question of deductibility are the period of time over which the taxpayer will derive a 
benefit from the [outlay] and the significance to the taxpayer of that benefit. [Outlays] must generally 
be capitalized when they . . . generate significant benefits for the taxpayer extending beyond the end of 
the taxable year.”) (citations omitted). 
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friendly takeover by one of its main customers.221 Before the takeover was 
approved, it had to ensure that its shareholders received a fair price for their 
shares.222 To fulfill its fiduciary duty to its shareholders, it paid $2.2 million 
to an investment firm “to evaluate its shares, [and] to render a fairness 
opinion”223 and $490,000 to a law firm to advise it on the tax consequences 
of the takeover.224 Then, it sought to immediately deduct these payments.225  
The taxpayer in INDOPCO argued that the compensation it paid to its 
investment and legal advisors ought to be deductible because it was for 
services rendered within the year of payment. However, the Court required 
that the compensation be capitalized since it was for services provided in 
connection with a takeover that would benefit the taxpayer for many years. 
As the Court explained, a cost “that ‘is of value in more than one taxable 
year’ is a nondeductible capital expenditure”226 while a cost that is of value 
primarily227 within the tax year is an immediately deductible expense.228  
As the unanimous opinion explained, the “predominant” factor 
determining whether an outlay is an immediately deductible expense or a 
capital expenditure is “the duration and extent of the benefits realized by the 
taxpayer.”229 As one scholar put it, “the broader implication of the 
INDOPCO decision was that taxpayers must capitalize expenditures made 
for the ‘betterment’ of . . . their business over a period of time ‘somewhat 
longer than the current taxable year.’”230 This is true even when the 
expenditure is compensation. 
The distinction between immediately deductible expenses and 
expenditures (which are “capitalized” meaning added to basis and recovered 
upon disposition of the asset or gradually over time through amortization or 
                                                      
221. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 80. 
222. Id. at 81.  
223. Id.  
224. Id. at 81–82. 
225. Id. at 82. (“National Starch claimed a deduction for the $2,225,586 paid to Morgan Stanley” 
and later asserted “the right to deduct . . . legal and miscellaneous expenses” on its year-of-merger tax 
return). 
226. Id. at 87 (citing United States v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310 (1972)). 
227. See id. (noting that “the mere presence of an incidental future benefit” does not require 
capitalization). 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 88. 
230. Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 691 (2017). 
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depreciation deductions)231 is fundamental to tax law.232 This distinction is 
maintained so that tax is imposed on net income. If a cost is fully expended 
within the year it is paid, then it is properly viewed as a cost of earning that 
year’s income and should be fully deducted against that year’s income.233 
In contrast, if a cost is not fully expended within the year it is paid, and 
instead retains value into future years, then it is properly viewed as a cost of 
earning income over many years. A portion of the cost should be deducted 
in each of the years benefitted so that, after accounting for these deductions, 
tax is imposed on net income. “The matching of a current year’s [outlays] 
that benefit future years with such future years’ income (by capitalization 
and basis recovery) is necessary in order to prevent distortion of income . . 
. .”234  
                                                      
231. DONALDSON & TOBIN, supra note 211, at 210 (“[W]hile taxpayers may be able to deduct 
various expenses paid or incurred during a taxable year, taxpayers generally cannot deduct capital 
expenditures. Instead, capital expenditures add to (or create) taxpayer’s basis in property . . . If a taxpayer 
must capitalize a cost, the taxpayer can recover that cost ultimately upon the sale or disposition of the 
underlying asset. . . . In many cases, however, taxpayers do not have to wait until disposition of an asset 
to recover the cost of a capital expenditure. Instead, the cost can be recovered over a period of years 
roughly equivalent to the useful life of the underlying asset. . . . With respect to intangible property, the 
applicable cost recovery system is called amortization.”). 
232. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, The Expenditures Incurred by the Target Corporation in an 
Acquisitive Reorganization Are Dividends to the Shareholders: (Pssst, Don’t Tell the Supreme Court) , 
53 TAX NOTES 463, 478 (1991) (“A strong law of capitalization is extraordinarily important to an income 
tax. Under the norms of an income tax, costs that constitute investments, generating future income for 
the taxpayer, are capitalized and may not be deducted so long as the costs continue to generate income.”); 
Lily Kahng, Who Owns Human Capital?, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 607, 624 (2017) (“Under the principle 
of capitalization, the foundational importance of which the Supreme Court has affirmed in its 
jurisprudence, capital owners ought to capitalize expenditures they incur to acquire or create intellectual 
capital.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 625 (“The idea that businesses should capitalize expenditures that 
produce future benefits is integral to the concept of income, and tax law has required capitalization since 
its inception.”) (footnotes omitted). 
233. Thus, the Code allows immediate deduction of supplies (typically tangible assets with a 
useful life of one year or less) and of intangible assets that satisfy the twelve-month simplifying 
convention. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3(a)-(c) (treating tangible assets with a useful life of one year or less as 
deductible supplies); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f) (treating intangible assets that satisfy the twelve-month 
simplifying convention as deductible). The twelve-month simplifying convention is not a faithful 
application of this principle since it allows immediate deduction of costs of intangibles that have benefit 
in the year following the year of payment. 
234. John W. Lee, Transaction Costs Relating to Acquisition or Enhancement of Intangible 
Property: A Populist, Political, but Practical Perspective, 22 VA. TAX REV. 273, 316 (2002); see also 
id. at 317–18 (describing the matching principle as theoretically correct and proposing certain times 
when “this theoretically correct matching should yield either to a current deduction or amortization over 
some safe harbor period to produce minimal distortion of income.”). 
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When expenditures that provide future benefits are treated as expenses 
and immediately deducted, the mismatch causes significant economic 
problems. As Calvin Johnson explains,  
When tax law violates the prime directive [that costs should be 
capitalized and recovered such that the remaining basis equals the 
remaining income-producing value of the investment], several 
terrible things happen. First, tax-rate neutrality is violated: Either 
high-bracket taxpayers outbid lower-bracket taxpayers for the same 
goods and investments or high-bracket taxpayers achieve an effective 
tax rate lower than the statutory tax rate that Congress has mandated. 
Second, [allowing tax deductions to outpace the actual economic 
decline in an asset’s value] means that investors move out of 
meritorious [slower-recovered] investments and into worse [quicker-
recovered] investment, just to take advantage of the tax benefit of low 
basis. Thirdly, adjusted basis below value means that debt financing 
of these investments produce artificial losses and negative taxes. The 
negative taxes shelter unrelated income from tax. Both tangible and 
intangible investments need to follow the same rules, whatever they 
are, just so that the shelter value of expensed intangibles will not lead 
to inferior investments appearing to be better.235 
If the distinction between expenses and expenditures was properly applied 
to employment noncompetes, noncompetes would be deemed expenditures. 
Employers do not benefit from them immediately, within the year in which 
they are acquired. Rather, employers begin benefiting from them after the 
employment relationship ends, and then gradually over the restricted period. 
Accordingly, any payments for employment noncompetes—whether or not 
in the form of compensation—should not be immediately deductible and 
instead should be capitalized and amortized over the restricted period.  
Despite its consistency with fundamental tax principles, the business 
community vehemently opposed INDOPCO. A lobbying group known as 
the “INDOPCO Coalition” formed to advocate for regulations that would 
narrow the ruling.236 It was successful.237 In 2004, Treasury issued final 
regulations “that significantly weakened the INDOPCO decision,”238 by 
                                                      
235. Johnson, supra note 198, at 1383. 
236. DONALDSON & TOBIN, supra note 211, at 244. See also Blasius v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 
274, 280 (2005) (referencing “years of intensive, and ultimately successful, lobbying by the likes of the 
INDOPCO Coalition to impress its views on the IRS”). 
237. See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 230, at 689 (arguing that the regulations “commonly known as 
the ‘INDOPCO regulations’” might better be termed the “‘anti-INDOPCO regulations’ because they 
effectively overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner”); id. at 691 (“In 
several respects, the regulations deviated from the INDOPCO decision in a ‘taxpayer-favorable’ 
direction.”) (citing Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, 105 TAX NOTES 435, 435–36 (2004)). 
238. DONALDSON & TOBIN, supra note 211, at 244. 
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reversing the default rule of capitalization for compensation payments that 
create long-term intangible assets and making deductibility the norm for 
created intangibles.239 These regulations also included several simplifying 
conventions to permit taxpayers to fully and immediately deduct costs that 
produce long-term benefits. Legal scholars critique the INDOPCO 
regulations as being an inappropriate use of Treasury’s power, especially 
because they undermined a decision by the United States Supreme Court.240 
They have further critiqued the simplifying conventions for inappropriately 
forfeiting billions of dollars in tax revenue for insufficient benefit.241 
Although the INDOPCO regulations do not clearly allow employers to 
immediately deduct the amounts they pay for employment noncompetes, 
they are ambiguous. Accordingly, in Part IV, this Article proposes changes 
to two of the INDOPCO regulations to clarify that payments for 
employment noncompetes should be capitalized. 
C. Violates Burden of Proof Rules 
In addition to getting right that outlays should be capitalized when they 
create benefits lasting beyond the tax year and deducted only when they 
create benefits that are exhausted within the tax year, INDOPCO got right 
the critically important matter of the burden of proof. Proper placement of 
the burden of proof is important in these cases because, as the Court noted, 
“the ‘decisive distinctions’ between current expenses and capital 
                                                      
239. James L. Atkinson, The Final INDOPCO Regulations: A Primer, 56 TAX EXECUTIVE 222, 
224 (2004). 
240. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
185, 243 (2004) (“When faced with a Supreme Court interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term in 
the Code that it wants changed, the Treasury has . . . [only one valid option, which is to] propose 
legislation to Congress to amend the underlying statute.”); id. at 243–44 (“Treasury has shown a recent 
tendency to choose [another] solution—attempting to change the interpretation in a taxpayer-friendly 
manner. . . . [An] example is the Treasury’s . . . promulgation of regulations regarding the important 
issue of whether an expense can be immediately deducted or must be capitalized. . . . [T]hese regulations 
are generally taxpayer-friendly (although not in every single case) and have been extensively praised by 
private practitioners. . . . [However,] these regulations are also inconsistent with a Supreme Court 
decision, INDOPCO v. Commissioner, that is directly on point. Accordingly, these regulations are 
invalid to the extent they are inconsistent with INDOPCO.”) (footnotes omitted). 
241. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 198, at 1394. 
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expenditures ‘are those of degree and not of kind,’” with each case turning 
on “its special facts.”242 Burden matters for close calls.  
In INDOPCO, the Court properly put the burden of proof on the taxpayer 
who sought to immediately deduct the compensation it paid for investment 
and legal services. After finding that the taxpayer “has not demonstrated 
that the investment banking, legal, and other costs it incurred . . . are 
deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses,” the Court required 
capitalization of these outlays.243 As the Court explained, “In exploring the 
relationship between deductions and capital expenditures, this Court has 
noted the ‘familiar rule’ that ‘an income tax deduction is a matter of 
legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing the right to the 
claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.’”244 All outlays are assumed to be 
expenditures. Thus, the default treatment of capitalization is avoided only 
when a taxpayer satisfies a “strictly construed”245 exception and establishes 
that the outlay does not produce significant future benefits. 
If tax law’s burden of proof rules were properly applied to employment 
noncompetes, then all payments for noncompetes would be capitalized. If 
these payments were aggregated with other payments—like compensation 
payments for current labor—then the aggregate payment should be 
capitalized except to the extent that the payor meets its burden to establish 
the deductible portion. 
D. Subsidizes that Which We Oppose 
By allowing employers to immediately deduct the full amounts they pay 
employees for becoming subject to noncompetes, the government provides 
a significant subsidy (one very much like the subsidy that section 401(k) 
gives to traditional retirement accounts) for noncompetes. This subsidy is 
shocking in light of the government’s clearly expressed—and justified—
opposition to employment noncompete agreements. 
                                                      
242. INDOPCO v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 86 (1992) (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 
114 (1933) and Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940)). 
243. Id. at 88. 
244. Id. at 84 (quoting Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943)). See also 
Fred W. Amend Co. v. Comm’r, 454 F.2d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 1971) (“[D]eductions [including section 
162 deductions for trade or business expenses] are a matter of legislative grace, and unless the claimed 
deduction comes clearly within the scope of the statute it is not to be allowed. The burden to make that 
showing rests upon the taxpayer.”) (citation omitted). But see Lohr v. Comm’r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1382, 
1384 (1976) (“[A] certain, limited class of deductions may be required to insure that the tax is imposed 
only upon ‘income [as required by the Sixteenth Amendment].’”) (citing Note, Taxability of Gross 
Income Under the Sixteenth Amendment, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 274 (1936)); Davis v. United States, 87 
F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied 301 U.S. 704 (1937) (speculating that certain deductions are 
required to ensure that the tax is imposed on income and not capital).  
245. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84. 
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First, it is useful to understand that the current subsidy for employment 
noncompetes is massive. This subsidy comes in the form of a full, 
immediate deduction provided to an employer for the cost of acquiring a 
noncompete agreement from its employee. As tax scholars have long 
recognized, when an immediate deduction is provided for an investment that 
produces long-term value, the result is equivalent to exempting returns on 
that investment from tax.246 The most accessible example of this yield-
exemption phenomenon is retirement accounts. Distributions from Roth 
retirement accounts are tax-exempt. By contrast, distributions from 
traditional retirement accounts are taxable. Nevertheless, assuming that the 
same tax rate applies to contributions to and distributions from retirement 
accounts, traditional retirement accounts are equivalent to Roth retirement 
accounts because the ability to fully and immediately deduct amounts 
invested in traditional accounts is as valuable as the ability to exempt returns 
from Roth accounts. The immediate deduction of contributions means that 
traditional retirement holders can afford to make larger investments and the 
returns on these larger investments are sufficient to cover their future tax 
bills.  
Unfortunately, the current payments that employers make to employees 
in exchange for noncompetes are like contributions to traditional retirement 
accounts in that they are fully and immediately deducted, produce long-term 
returns on investment, and give rise to future taxes on returns that can be 
                                                      
246. This “yield-exemption” phenomenon depends on certain assumptions, including that the 
initial deduction is taken at the same tax rate as applies to all future returns on the investment. The yield-
exemption phenomenon was first explained by MIT economist E. Cary Brown. See, e.g., Rebecca 
Morrow, Government as Investor: The Case of Immediate Expensing, 106 KY. L.J. 1, 8 (2017) (“In 
short, [the yield-exemption phenomenon] observes that a taxpayer who immediately expenses an asset 
receives an extraordinary benefit from the government at the time of investment in the form of tax 
savings equal to the cost of the investment times the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. These tax savings 
mimic a capital contribution. If they are used to fund part of the investment’s purchase price, then the 
outcome is analogous to the government putting up capital equal to the tax savings and the purchaser 
putting up the remaining capital. When the government then . . . collects a proportionate share of profits 
from the investment (by taxing them), the imposition of tax is analogous to the government taking a 
proportionate return on its up-front capital contribution.”); Johnson, Expenditures Incurred by the Target 
Corporation, supra note 232, at 478 (“The thesis that expensing an investment, that is, deducting it 
immediately, is equivalent to exempting the subsequent income from the investment from tax, is one of 
the bulwarks of modern tax economics, but it is not generally known or appreciated within the tax law 
community.”). 
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paid for with the tax savings from the initial deduction plus the returns on 
those initial tax savings.  
This subsidy is not unique to employment noncompetes. Tax scholars 
have long recognized instances in which tax law allows the full, immediate 
deduction of investments that produce long-term benefits. For example, the 
INDOPCO regulations247 allow employers to fully immediately deduct 
employee compensation even when it is paid to create an intangible with 
long-term value. However, in the case of employment noncompetes, this 
subsidy is worse. 
Professor Calvin Johnson rightly opposes the many features of the 
INDOPCO regulations that allow for the full and immediate deduction of 
costs that produce long-term value.248 He argues that the INDOPCO 
regulations are wrong-headed in presenting these features as simplifying 
conventions or de minimis exceptions that are justified by considerations 
such as administrability and ease of compliance. On the contrary, he 
suggests, they are dangerous violations of tax law’s critical capitalization 
rules that result in hundreds of billions of dollars of lost tax revenue and a 
dangerous misallocation of resources toward long-term investments that can 
be deducted. Thus, Johnson argues that taxpayers should not be allowed to 
immediately deduct, and instead should be required to capitalize, their 
investments in intellectual capital, “businesses’ investment in and 
production of intangible sources of future value, which often require a high 
proportion of labor inputs.”249 
Professor Lily Kahng agrees and observes that the full, immediate 
deduction of employer investments in long-term intangibles produced by 
their employees250 is increasingly problematic as the value of intangibles 
surges and becomes an ever-greater driver of firm value and economic 
growth.251 While rules allowing full, immediate deduction of investments in 
                                                      
247. Particularly, Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (as amended in 2004). 
248. See Calvin H. Johnson, First Do No Harm: The Senate Staff Discussion Draft on Cost 
Recovery, 142 TAX NOTES 549, 550–51 (2014); Calvin H. Johnson, Extend the Tax Life for Acquired 
Intangibles to 75 Years, 135 TAX NOTES 1053, 1053–56 (2012); Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalize Costs of 
Software Development, 124 TAX NOTES 603 (2009); Calvin H. Johnson, The Effective Tax Ratio and the 
Undertaxation of Intangibles, 121 TAX NOTES 1289 (2008); Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalization After the 
Government’s Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAX NOTES 1323 (1994); Johnson, supra note 198, at 478. 
249. Kahng, Who Owns Human Capital?, supra note 232, at 610 n.10; Calvin H. Johnson, The 
Effective Tax Ratio and the Undertaxation of Intangibles, 121 TAX NOTES 1289, 1289 (2008) (calling 
for “fixing the problem of intangibles by aggressively capitalizing intangible investments.”). 
250. Kahng, Who Owns Human Capital?, supra note 232, at 629 (“The INDOPCO regulations set 
forth an exclusive list of eight relatively narrow types of intangible assets whose development or creation 
costs businesses must capitalize. Even though other self-created intangibles in theory might be subject 
to capitalization, in practice, the INDOPCO regulations permit taxpayers to deduct all other self-created 
intangibles ‘without hesitation.’”) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO 
Regulations, 105 TAX NOTES 435, 437 (2004)). 
251. Id. at 613 (“Economists estimate that official measures of gross domestic product in recent 
years omitted as much as one trillion dollars per year of investments in intellectual capital.”); id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2018] NONCOMPETES AS TAX EVASION 319 
 
 
 
 
long-term intangibles are presented as mere simplifying conventions or de 
minimis exceptions, Kahng cautions that tax law’s current improper 
allowance of “deductions for most investments in intellectual capital[] is 
fundamentally flawed . . . [and] results in the loss of hundreds of billions of 
dollars in tax revenues, costly misallocations of resources, and a grave 
deviation from the accurate measure of income.”252  
As Kahng explains in an application of the yield-exemption 
phenomenon, “the deduction for self-created intellectual capital effectively 
imposes a zero rate of tax on returns from this capital.”253 Because tax law 
only allows full, immediate deduction of investments in self-created 
intangibles and requires capitalization and amortization of investments in 
acquired intangibles, tax law encourages businesses to misallocate 
resources by buying too few intangibles from third parties and acquiring too 
many intangibles from its own workers. Further, it incentivizes employers 
to increase the damaging trend of turning the fruit of their employees’ 
knowledge and skills into a commodity owned by the employer and severed 
from attachment to the employee. “In sum,” concludes Kahng, “the tax law, 
by allowing capital owners to deduct the costs of self-created intellectual 
capital, subsidizes the propertization of labor and enhances capital owners’ 
ability to appropriate a greater share of the return [on labor] at the expense 
of their workers’ share.”254  
Kahng advocates a reversal of the INDOPCO regulations so that 
employers would be required to capitalize the costs of creating intellectual 
capital.255 This proposal would reflect a return to INDOPCO’s rule that 
compensation is not deductible to the extent that it is a cost of producing 
long-term benefits. 
One might view an employment noncompete as just another type of 
intangible asset obtained by an employer from an employee, or what Calvin 
                                                      
(“Google and Microsoft’s self-created intangible assets are worth hundreds of billions of dollars, as 
evidenced by their market capitalization . . . .”); id. at 614 (“[I]ntellectual capital accounted for 27 percent 
of economic growth, putting it on par with tangible capital in importance as a source of economic 
growth.”). 
252. Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2229, 2229 (2014). 
253. Kahng, Who Owns Human Capital?, supra note 232, at 631. 
254. Id. at 639. 
255. Id. at 648. 
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Johnson describes as “intangible investments”256 or Lily Kahng describes as 
“intellectual capital”257 or “human capital.”258 These categories of 
intangibles have been described as “dark matter” because their definitions 
are elusive and fluid.259 Putting aside definitional concerns for a moment, 
however, one might view an employment noncompete simply as another 
intangible asset falling in one or more of these categories. An employer pays 
compensation to an employee in exchange for a noncompete just as it pays 
compensation to an employee in exchange for a strategic plan, or for a 
marketing idea, or for increasing brand recognition or goodwill. These 
investments produce long-term benefit, and so, as Johnson, Kahng and 
others260 advocate, a portion of the compensation paid to employees should 
be allocated to the associated future benefits and that portion of 
compensation should be capitalized rather than immediately deducted. 
Treating employment noncompetes as just another type of intangible 
asset—either created by or acquired from an employee and requiring their 
capitalization—would be an improvement. However, this view does not go 
far enough.  
Employment noncompetes are not like other intangible assets obtained 
by employers from their employees. Their differences—and the magnitude 
of their importance—justify a unique tax treatment.  
First, employment noncompetes are unlike other intangible assets 
obtained by employers from employees in that they trigger delayed benefits 
as opposed to long-term benefits. Generally, the intangibles that employers 
receive from their employees—things like strategic planning, marketing, 
brand recognition, and goodwill—produce economic benefits immediately 
upon acquisition. They should be capitalized because their economic 
                                                      
256. Calvin H. Johnson, The Effective Tax Ratio and the Undertaxation of Intangibles, 121 TAX 
NOTES 1289, 1291 (2008). 
257. See supra note 249 and accompanying text; Kahng, Who Owns Human Capital?, supra note 
232, at 610, n.10.; Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, supra note 252, at 2235 (defining 
intellectual capital as “sources of probable future economic profits, lacking physical substance, which 
are controlled by a firm as a result of previous events or transactions”) (emphasis omitted).  
258. Kahng, Who Owns Human Capital?, supra note 232, at 610, n.10. 
259. Charlene D. Luke, Illuminating the Dark Matter of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. F. 
61, 61 n.1 (2015) (quoting Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2229, 2231 
(2014)); Ricardo Hausmann & Federico Sturzenegger, ‘Dark Matter’ Makes the U.S. Deficit Disappear, 
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2005), https://www.ft.com/content/efc48142-6753-11da-a650-0000779e2340 
(“‘[D]ark matter’ . . . corresponds to assets that generate revenue but cannot be seen.”); Kahng, Who 
Owns Human Capital?, supra note 232, at 612 n.16 (“Despite the difficulty of precisely defining 
intellectual capital, the concept is easy to grasp intuitively, and its many definitions share core 
similarities.”). 
260. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short-
Term Intangibles, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2004); Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, 105 
TAX NOTES 435 (2004); John Lee, Eldridge Blanton, Veena Luthra, Glenn Walberg, & Darryl Whitesell, 
Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for Rough Justice Regulations (Part One), 23 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 631 (1997); George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1179 (1987). 
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benefits last beyond a tax year. But these intangibles begin wasting 
immediately and are often most valuable in the year of acquisition and less 
valuable in subsequent years.261  
The common feature of employment noncompetes is that they do not 
even begin wasting—indeed, they do not begin binding—until the 
employment relationship terminates.262 It is possible that they provide some 
ancillary benefit before the employment relationship terminates if, for 
example, they cause a valuable employee to stay longer than she would in 
the absence of a noncompete. However, the primary benefit begins when 
the employment relationship ends. Thus, employment noncompetes should 
be amortized over a different recovery period from other intangible assets 
obtained by employers from employees. Amortization of employment 
noncompetes generally should not even begin until the employment 
relationship terminates.263  
Second, employment noncompetes are unlike other intangible assets 
obtained by employers from employees in that their useful lives are easily 
determinable. Noncompetes bind, and have value to an employer, over a 
specified period. This makes them unlike strategic planning, marketing, 
brand recognition, goodwill, and similar intangibles whose useful lives are 
amorphous and can only be roughly approximated. Since the value that an 
employer receives from an employment noncompete is gradually spent over 
the restricted period, amortization ought to occur ratably over that restricted 
period. 
Finally, employment noncompetes should not be treated as though they 
produce the types of positive externalities produced by other created 
intangibles. Employer investments in strategic planning, marketing, brand 
recognition, goodwill, and similar intangibles generally are pro-competitive 
and produce benefits for employees and the public. In contrast, and as was 
                                                      
261. Advertising, for example, includes significant immediate and short-term benefits and 
diminishing, trailing longer-term benefits. See, e.g., Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten & Daniel Sichel, 
Intangible Capital and U.S. Economic Growth, 55 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 661, 670 (2009). 
262. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
263. There may be instances in which an employer can prove that an employment noncompete 
has value before the restricted period because, for example, it increases the employer’s ability to retain 
valuable employees. The burden to prove this ought to be high but, if met, might require allocation of 
more value to the noncompete and might support recovery over a period that begins before the 
employment relationship terminates. 
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detailed in Part I, employer investments in employment noncompete 
agreements generally are anti-competitive and produce harms for 
employees and the public. While tax law might aim to incentivize employer 
investments in other created intangibles through amortization rules that 
include taxpayer-friendly safe harbors for example, it ought not aim to 
incentivize employer investments in employment noncompetes. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
This Article proposes a change to the tax treatment of employment 
noncompetes. Instead of continuing to allow employers to immediately 
deduct the full compensation they pay to employees subject to 
noncompetes, the IRS should take a more aggressive stance and one that 
better comports with bedrock tax principles.  
When an employer compensates an employee who is subject to a 
noncompete, the IRS should require that the employer establish what 
portion of compensation is allocable to the noncompete.264 The employer 
must establish the value of the noncompete, and therefore, the amount of 
compensation that should be deemed to pay for it. If the employer later 
brings a suit, claiming that an employee breached the noncompete and is 
liable for damages, then the employee should be permitted to obtain this 
allocation via discovery and to admit it into evidence as information 
relevant to damages.265  
                                                      
264. The IRS should require employers to disclose on each employee’s W-2 form if that employee 
is covered by an employment noncompete. Even if state law makes an employment noncompete 
unenforceable in court, that noncompete should be disclosed and generally should be deemed to have 
value to the employer based on its ability to discourage an employee from changing jobs. Cf. Flamingo 
Resort, Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding value for tax purposes in 
debts receivable from gambling customers even though state law made those debts unenforceable in 
court because “the taxpayer rarely had to resort to litigation to collect” the unenforceable obligations, 
and instead engaged in legally-unsanctioned enforcement efforts that by “its own estimates” resulted in 
collections “as high as ninety-six percent,” leading the court to conclude that the value of these legally 
unenforceable obligations resulted from their high practical enforceability. As the court explained “it is 
doubtful that legal enforceability of the ‘markers’ would or could increase its recovery rate. . . . [meaning 
that the taxpayer’s] inability to enforce its ‘markers’ in court is not a sufficient” basis to ignore their 
value.); Calvin Johnson, supra note 198, at 1387 (explaining that, even when unenforceable in court, a 
“gambling marker is an asset—a receivable—because of the respect given to it by the commercial market 
even without legal enforcement”). But see Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that 
after a portion of a legally unenforceable debt was successfully disputed, cancellation of that portion did 
not give rise to cancellation of debt income); Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. U.S., 195 F.3d 216 (1999) 
(noting “critical difference between [legally unenforceable] disputed and [legally unenforceable] 
undisputed debts”). 
265. An employer who places a low value on a noncompete for tax purposes should have a more 
difficult time enforcing that noncompete against a former employee because the low value would tend 
to indicate that the noncompete is narrow (making it less likely that a court would enjoin competitive 
employment or find competitive employment to breach the noncompete) and of little value (causing low 
damage awards even if breach is found). Cf. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions 
to Tax Avoidance, 62 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 2, 19 (2015) (arguing that a multinational corporation that places 
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More importantly, the IRS should require employers to support the 
allocation with competent evidence about the value of the noncompete. This 
evidence likely will be difficult, but not impossible, to obtain. It will often 
depend on expert reports. It should be given more persuasive authority if it 
was disclosed to the employee before the employee executed the 
noncompete. The need to acquire this evidence will discourage employers 
from engaging in excessive use of employment noncompetes. Further, this 
evidence will help inform employees—who may underestimate the 
importance of noncompetes when they execute them—to better understand 
how valuable they are to employers, and how correspondingly costly they 
are to employees.  
Then, the IRS should allow immediate deduction of only the portion of 
compensation not allocated to the noncompete. The portion of 
compensation allocated to the noncompete should be capitalized and 
amortized ratably over the restricted period, beginning when the 
employment relationship terminates.  
Finally, if an employer fails to carry its burden of proof to establish what 
portion of compensation is allocable to the noncompete (and thus, 
capitalized and amortized over the restricted period) and what portion is not 
(and thus, eligible for immediate deduction), then the IRS should apply tax 
law’s burden of proof rules to deny employers any deduction for the 
compensation they pay to employees subject to noncompetes. 
Interestingly, this more aggressive stance is consistent with and would 
not require changes to the Internal Revenue Code. Arguably, it would not 
require changes to Treasury Regulations, either.266  
                                                      
a low value on an intellectual property asset for tax purposes should have a more difficult time enforcing 
that intellectual property against an “alleged infringer” because the low value would tend to indicate 
“the IP’s invalidity, the lack of infringement, lower damages, the inappropriateness of injunctions, and 
inequitable behavior.”). 
266. It is not clear that an amendment to Regulation 1.263(a)-4(c)(3) is necessary because it is not 
clear that a noncompete is an intangible acquired from an employee. It is also not clear that an 
amendment to Regulation 1.263(a)-4(d)(6)(i)(C) is necessary because compensation paid to an employee 
subject to a noncompete ought not be deemed exclusively “reasonable compensation for services 
actually rendered” for reasons detailed in Section II.F (employers consistently assert that compensation 
is partially for the noncompete and partially for services actually rendered) and Section V.G (regardless 
of employers’ assertions, tax law should independently find that compensation is partially for the 
noncompete and partially for services actually rendered). Finally, it is not clear whether an employment 
noncompete is “intrinsically capable of being sold, transferred or pledged . . . separate and apart from a 
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However, in an effort to provide fair notice to taxpayers of a significant 
change to the IRS’s litigating position, and to clarify that existing Treasury 
Regulations cannot be read to allow immediate deduction of all 
compensation paid to employees subject to noncompetes, this Article 
proposes amendments to two INDOPCO regulations, Treasury Regulations 
1.263(a)-4(c)(3) and 1.263(a)-4(d)(6)(i)(C). 
Regulation 1.263(a)-4(c)(3) should be amended as indicated in 
brackets:  
Intangibles acquired from an employee. Amounts paid to an 
employee to acquire an intangible from that employee are not 
required to be capitalized under this section if the amounts are 
includible in the employee’s income in connection with the 
performance of services under section 61 or 83 [except to the extent 
that these amounts are paid to an employee who is subject to a 
noncompete, in which case an adequate amount of compensation 
must be allocated to the noncompete, capitalized, and amortized over 
the restricted period set forth in the noncompete]. 
Regulation 1.263(a)-4(d)(6)(i)(C) should be amended as indicated in 
brackets:  
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph (d)(6),267 a taxpayer 
must capitalize amounts paid to another party to create, originate, 
enter into, renew or renegotiate with that party— . . . A covenant not 
to compete or an agreement having substantially the same effect as a 
covenant not to compete (except, in the case of an agreement that 
requires the performance of services, [the taxpayer must allocate an 
adequate amount of compensation to the covenant not to compete and 
then may deduct any remaining compensation] to the extent that the 
[remaining compensation] represents reasonable compensation for 
services actually rendered).  
While existing regulations would allow the IRS to challenge employers 
when they immediately deduct the full compensation they pay to employees 
subject to noncompetes, the IRS has not advanced these challenges. Thus, 
the above regulatory amendments aim to provide notice that the IRS will 
begin advancing these challenges and will require employers to allocate a 
portion of compensation to the noncompete and to amortize that portion of 
compensation over the period benefited by the noncompete. 
                                                      
trade or business,” as is required by the definition of separate and distinct intangible asset in Treasury 
Regulation § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3). 
267. For exceptions based on the de minimis rule and the twelve-month simplifying convention, 
see supra note 188. 
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V. WHY TAX LAW IS A STRONGER APPROACH 
By failing to challenge employers when they fully deduct the 
compensation they pay to employees who are subject to noncompetes, the 
IRS has allowed tax law to create significant subsidies for employment 
noncompetes. The proposal in this Article would convert tax law from a 
source of subsidy into a tool of resistance. There is reason to hope that the 
previously unused tool of tax law might be uniquely successful in curtailing 
excessive and harmful employment noncompetes because it avoids many of 
the pitfalls of contract-law-based approaches. 
A. Consistency with Tax Law Principles  
As was detailed in section II.A., contract-law-based approaches to 
curtailing noncompetes are in tension with foundational contract law 
principles that favor upholding written contracts between consenting adults, 
disfavor second-guessing the adequacy of consideration, and treat third-
party interests and public interests as secondary to the wishes of the 
contracting parties. In contrast, tax-law-based approaches to curtailing 
noncompetes are in tension only with simplifying conventions won by 
lobbyists and adopted for the sake of convenience. Indeed, these approaches 
would represent a reassertion of fundamental tax law principles that require 
capitalization of costs that produce long-term benefits, aim to have costs 
recovered over the period that they produce benefit, treat immediate 
deductions as strictly construed exceptions to the norm of capitalization, and 
aim each year to tax employers on the net income they earn in that year. 
B. Powerful Enough to Change Employer Behavior 
As was detailed in Section II.C, contract-law-based approaches to 
curtailing noncompetes have failed, at least in part, because they rely on 
employees to act as private enforcers of the law. Even in the rare instances 
when an employee recognizes that she has a strong legal claim to set aside 
a noncompete, pays legal counsel, and wins, she is unlikely to deter her 
former employer from using overly broad noncompetes in the future. 
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Typical contract-law-based remedies for overly broad noncompetes include 
reforming the noncompete to make it lawful, or at worst, setting it aside. 
In contrast, the tax-law-based approach proposed in this Article is likely 
to achieve far greater deterrence. Revenue agents are expert public enforcers 
of the law. They have access to paid legal counsel and are skilled at litigating 
valuation disputes. When they win, as they often do,268 they are likely to 
deter employers from using overly broad noncompetes in the future. Tax-
law-based remedies will be imposed if the employer is found to have 
allocated insufficient value to a noncompete and will include a deficiency 
judgment,269 interest, and monetary penalties. 
One might initially worry that simply changing the timing of when 
employers can deduct the amounts they pay to employees in exchange for 
noncompete provisions—but not changing either the fact of eventual 
deductibility or the total amount of deductibility—will be insufficient to 
change employer behavior. Some employers might be nearly as happy 
capitalizing and amortizing the costs of an employment noncompete as 
fully, immediately deducting them. After all, employers appear to be largely 
unaffected by changes to contract law rules affecting the legal enforceability 
of employment noncompetes,270 so they might be similarly unaffected by 
changes to tax law rules. However, as tax scholars have long recognized, 
the timing of when a cost can be deducted is nearly the whole ballgame.  
When employers can immediately deduct the full cost of an investment 
that has long-term value, that treatment is equivalent to exempting the 
investment from tax.271 Recall that time value of money considerations are 
strong enough to make traditional retirement accounts (whose deposits 
qualify for full, immediate deduction) as valuable as Roth retirement 
accounts (whose withdrawals are tax-exempt).272 For this reason, disputes 
about the timing of when an employer may deduct a cost—not disputes 
about the fact of eventual deductibility or the total amount of deductibility—
are the most common source of audits of large and mid-size businesses273 
                                                      
268. See, e.g., TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 349, https:// 
taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_Volume1.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/S3ZB-GDXD] (in cases involving the ten most litigated issues, taxpayers prevailed in whole or in 
part only 15% of the time if they were pro se and only 24% of the time if they were represented by 
counsel); id. at 350 (“Overall, the IRS prevailed in 89 percent of motions for summary judgment (97 
cases) and in about 70 percent of bench opinions (65 cases).”). 
269. If an employer allocates no or insufficient value to a noncompete, that employer will have 
immediately deducted too much employee compensation. That inflated deduction will cause the tax paid 
by the employer to be deficient when compared to the tax that should have been paid. 
270. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra note 246 (explaining how and under what conditions the full, immediate deduction 
of a long-term investment is equivalent to exempting the yields on that investment from tax). 
272. Id. 
273. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 234, at 277 (“[O]ver the last decade, expensing versus capitalizing 
of costs with present and future, often intangible benefits became the most significant federal income 
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and “the issue with the most dollars at stake.” 274 For example, looking solely 
at the 117 IRS Office of Appeals cases filed by large businesses in 1993, 
disputes about the timing of deductions accounted for “$1.1 billion of the 
total $1.9 billion in proposed tax adjustments.”275 The importance of timing 
to employers, coupled with the difficulty of meeting the burdens of proof 
that the proposal in this Article places on employers, are likely to be 
significant enough to change employer behavior and meaningfully 
discourage the excessive use of employment noncompetes. 
C. Encourages Employers to Narrow Scope and Application  
As was detailed in Section II.B., currently, employers have a largely 
unchecked incentive to write employment noncompetes as broadly as 
possible. This incentive has led to nearly one in five American workers 
being covered by an employment noncompete, even though many covered 
workers do not even have access to the trade secrets that their employers 
claim to be protecting via the noncompete. It also leads to noncompetes like 
the one previously used by Amazon that appear to cover a large range of 
competitive activities worldwide. Currently, if an employment noncompete 
is so broad as to be unlawful, employers still benefit because many workers 
are chilled from seeking competitive employment, few workers know when 
                                                      
tax issue in audits of big businesses, which report the bulk of both the corporate sector income and 
additional tax revenues raised by tax audits and collections.”); id. at 278 (explaining that “[b]etween 
25% and 40% of the audit and litigation resources of the Large and Mid-Size Business unit (LMSB) of 
the Service” were devoted to expensing versus capitalization issues); Ethan Yale, When Are 
Capitalization Exceptions Justified?, 57 TAX L. REV. 549, 549 n.1 (2004) (noting that “approximately 
25% of audit resources for large and mid-sized businesses are devoted to capitalization issues”) (citing 
John E. Hembera, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Capitalization Issues on Front Burner, Olson Says, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Aug. 3, 2001, at 152-7). 
274. Morrow, supra note 246, at 4 n.2 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-
232, TAX ADMINISTRATION: RECURRING ISSUES IN TAX DISPUTES OVER BUSINESS EXPENSE 
DEDUCTIONS 2 (1995)) (“In the 117 Office of Appeals cases, large corporate taxpayers disagreed with 
IRS most frequently over the issue of capital expenditures, which accounted for about 42 percent of the 
issues they contested. It was also the issue with the most dollars at stake in the 117 cases, accounting for 
$1.1 billion of the total $1.9 billion in proposed tax adjustments. In these cases, the corporations argued 
for immediate deduction of large expenses[,] . . . . [while] IRS contended that such expenditures had 
future benefits and should therefore be treated as capital expenditures, not immediately deductible in the 
current tax year.”) (alterations in original). 
275. Id. 
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noncompetes are unlawful, and even fewer workers bring legal challenges 
to set aside overly broad noncompetes. In those rare instances when an 
overly broad employment noncompete is successfully challenged in court, 
many courts bend over backwards using equitable reformation and blue-
pencil doctrines to uphold a narrowed version of the unlawful noncompete 
agreement. In sum, employers enjoy the benefits of writing overly broad 
noncompetes and of imposing these noncompetes on an overly broad set of 
employees. Employers do not suffer the costs of overbreadth.  
In contrast, tax-law-based approaches to curtailing noncompetes would 
cause employers to internalize at least some of the costs of overbreadth. An 
employment noncompete that restricts an employee from a broader range of 
activities (for example, manufacturing as well as distribution), or over a 
larger geographic range, or for a longer duration is a more valuable 
noncompete. With that increased value comes an increased allocation of 
compensation to the noncompete. With that increased allocation comes a 
decreased immediate deduction.  
If the IRS required capitalization of compensation allocable to 
noncompetes, then employers seeking to immediately deduct as much 
compensation as possible would have a new incentive to write employment 
noncompetes as narrowly as possible. This incentive might not fully 
outweigh employers’ competing incentives to write broader-than-necessary 
noncompetes, but it would at least partially counter those incentives. 
Perhaps most importantly, it would discourage employers from imposing 
noncompetes on employees who do not have access to trade secrets. 
D. Resolves Uncertainty in Favor of the Vulnerable 
Readers may worry that this proposal goes too far and that it will prevent 
even necessary and efficient noncompetes from being executed. As with any 
proposal, there are no facts about the future. However, even if this proposal 
discourages employers from using employment noncompetes when they 
would have been efficient and appropriate, employers can still protect their 
confidential information by enforcing intellectual property laws against 
their former employees.  
Further, policies that are currently rare in the United States,276 but more 
common in places like England and New Zealand, can fill gaps in 
intellectual property law that are currently filled by employment 
noncompetes. Like employment noncompetes, so-called “garden leave” 
policies prevent a former employee from competing with her former 
employer for a set period of time. However, they are structured differently, 
                                                      
276. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 135, at 9 (“Oregon is currently the only state that has 
some form of a ‘garden leave’ requirement.”). 
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and in ways that better protect employees from exploitation.277 Garden leave 
policies keep former employees on the payroll for a set period of time 
following active employment in exchange for restricting them from 
obtaining new and competitive employment.278 Former employees are paid 
to stay home (out of the competitive workforce) and to “tend their gardens” 
during the time when their insider information is most threatening to their 
former employers. From the employee perspective, garden leave policies 
are less exploitative because they more transparently show how much an 
employee will be paid in exchange for refraining from competitive 
employment, require employers to bear direct costs to prevent competition, 
and discourage excessively long restrictions on competition.279 From a tax 
perspective, garden leave policies are unlike employment noncompetes 
because the timing of payment matches the timing of benefit. Each month, 
a former employer pays a former employee not to compete during that 
month and properly deducts that payment. To the extent that employers have 
legitimate claims that intellectual property laws offer insufficient protection 
of their inside information, garden leave policies allow them to buy more 
protection when appropriate and necessary. 
Finally, even if the proposal advocated in this Article goes too far and 
under-protects employers while over-protecting employees, going too far is 
the right mistake to make as part of a search for an optimal balance between 
employer and employee interests. In an article that faced a similar 
dilemma—the dilemma of how to better protect currently under-protected 
wage claimants, tort claimants, and other involuntary and unsecured 
                                                      
277. See id. (“Post-employment compensation during the restricted period of a non-compete 
agreement, or what is more commonly referred to as a ‘garden leave’ provision, creates an incentive for 
employers to require non-competes only for those employees who pose a risk to the firm’s legitimate 
business interests. Because ‘garden leave’ constitutes a direct cost, employers are likely to be more 
cautious when deciding to include them in an employment contract.”); id. (Garden leave policies “create 
a cost mechanism that reduces the likelihood that non-compete agreements will be used unnecessarily.”). 
278. See, e.g., id. (“[Oregon’s garden leave] statute ‘[p]rovides the employee, for the time the 
employee is restricted from working, the greater of compensation equal to at least 50 percent of the 
employee’s annual gross base salary and commissions at the time of the employee’s termination or 50 
percent of the median family income for a four-person family . . . .’”) (alteration in original). 
279. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (explaining how garden leave discourages overly 
broad restrictions on competition). 
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creditors “in a world of disputed theories and imperfect information”280—
Elizabeth Warren thoughtfully suggests that we should err on the side of 
overcorrection. In Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 
Full Priority Debates, she proposes that we not resolve information gaps by 
favoring politically privileged groups and enacting change meekly, but that 
we resolve them by favoring politically disadvantaged groups and enact 
change meaningfully.281 As Warren observes,  
The group that profits from [the status quo] is well-funded and active, 
fully represented in all the policy debates and in the decisionmaking 
bodies. . . . If they—and all their academic supporters—make a 
persuasive case, they should win. But if they do not, then the party 
who has not had the opportunity to make its case should win. In the 
case of a tie, the unfunded, the unheard, and the unorganized should 
be declared the winners.282  
Just as “[t]he lawyers of commercial lenders ably explain their views about 
how a shift away from full priority will cause their clients to alter their 
lending practices and constrict credit, thereby hurting all businesses,”283 
representatives of employers ably explain their views about how a shift 
away from employment noncompete protections will cause employers to 
alter their training practices and reduce innovation, thereby hurting all 
businesses. Less is heard from unfunded and unorganized groups of 
employees. Thus, when information is incomplete, it is appropriate that 
policymaking err on the side of benefiting unfunded, unheard, and 
unorganized employees and that overcorrections be moderated as more 
complete information becomes available. 
E. Provides Employer-Funded Information to Guide Reform 
As was noted earlier, the information-providing task that this proposal 
puts on employers is heavy.284 As the bearers of the burden of proof, 
employers will have to hire experts to allocate a portion of aggregate 
compensation to the employee’s noncompete, and to resolve difficult 
questions about whether that portion is fixed, or whether it decreases over 
time as the employer pays higher compensation for a greater number of 
years to compensate for the same restricted period, or whether it increases 
as the competitive employment opportunities available to an employee grow 
                                                      
280. Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority 
Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1997). 
281. Id. at 1394. 
282. Id.  
283. Id.  
284. See supra Section IV. 
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more valuable. The burden of valuing noncompetes is heavy, and it is right 
that this heavy burden rest primarily with the employer. Placing this burden 
on the employer is consistent with tax law because it treats capitalization as 
the norm and deductibility as the exception to that norm. Further, placing 
this burden on the employer is consistent with broader equitable 
considerations because employers are the parties who want to use 
noncompetes.  
If, after implementing the policy proposed in this Article, experience 
demonstrates that it is overly hostile toward noncompetes, stifling training 
and innovation to a greater extent than it fosters lawful knowledge-sharing, 
wage competition, and employee mobility, then by all means, it should be 
moderated.  
In that case, the employer-funded information about how employment 
noncompetes ought to be valued will help guide better reforms than can be 
enacted currently. For example, the Department of Treasury could use the 
newly available data valuing noncompetes to make it easier for employers 
to use them appropriately. Treasury might establish safe harbors providing 
that if a minimum specified percent of compensation is allocated to a 
standardized noncompete provision,285 then the employer will be deemed to 
have allocated adequate value to the noncompete and can then confidently 
deduct the remaining compensation. Tax law often suggests standardized 
provisions to resolve difficult valuation disputes and provides preferential 
tax treatment in exchange for using a standardized provision.286 These safe 
harbors might provide the additional benefit of encouraging employers to 
                                                      
285. An alternative safe harbor might specify a minimum percent of compensation to be allocated 
to a noncompete for each month of the restriction period. 
286. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 2702 is a taxpayer-unfriendly provision that generally values 
retained interests in property at zero, making the full value of the property included in the gifted or 
bequeathed estate. However, it also includes taxpayer-friendly safe harbors that will value the retained 
interest as greater than zero provided it is structured in a specified form to make valuation easier. The 
standardized retained interest can be the right to receive: 1) “fixed amounts payable not less frequently 
than annually,” 2) “a fixed percentage of the fair market value of the property in the trust (determined 
annually),” or 3) any “noncontingent remainder” of the rights 1) and/or 2). 26 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)–(3) 
(2016). This provision encourages taxpayers to simplify otherwise thorny valuation questions by 
structuring transfers into standardized forms like Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts (GRATs), Grantor 
Retained Unitrusts (GRUTs), Grantor Lead Annuity Trusts (GLATs) and Grantor Lead Unitrusts 
(GLUTs), for which the IRS can issue standardized valuation tables. Similar rules encourage the creation 
of standardized charitable transfers, including CRATs, CRUTs, CLATs, and CLUTs. 
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use standardized noncompetes, which would increase employee 
understanding of noncompetes, enable employees to compare noncompetes 
proposed by competing prospective employers, and increase employees’ 
ability to predict when standardized noncompetes will be judicially upheld 
or set aside. Regardless of whether a safe harbor is later implemented, an 
appropriate safe harbor can only be established using good evidence of the 
value of noncompetes. By allowing employers to fully deduct all 
compensation paid to employees covered by noncompetes, and by not 
requiring any allocation of value to the noncompete, the IRS has forfeited 
an opportunity to begin collecting this valuable data.  
F. Properly Rejects Accelerated Recovery 
Readers familiar with trends in tax law will note that, while matching 
cost recovery with the period benefited by the cost is a key principle of a 
normative income tax, the United States has spent decades moving away 
from this key principle and away from a normative income tax. From the 
modified accelerated cost recovery system,287 to bonus depreciation,288 to 
immediate expensing,289 modern tax laws have intentionally permitted cost 
recovery before the period benefited. These and other accelerated cost 
recovery provisions reflect lawmakers’ collective desire to incentivize 
taxpayers to invest more in long-term assets. Lawmakers use incentives that 
collapse the fundamental distinction between expenses and expenditures 
and sacrifice the matching principle. This trend is significant. For example, 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, enacted on December 22, 2017, increased bonus 
depreciation to 100% (making certain otherwise depreciable expenditures 
eligible for full, immediate deduction)290 and increased immediate 
expensing to $1,000,000 (allowing taxpayers to treat certain otherwise 
depreciable expenditures as though they were currently deductible 
expenses).291 
However, even given this trend, tax law has not abandoned matching. If 
it does, the United States will cease to have an income tax and will instead 
                                                      
287. 26 U.S.C. § 168(a) accelerates depreciation in many ways, including by adopting recovery 
periods that are intentionally shorter than the useful lives of depreciable assets, thus earning the statute’s 
title Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery. 
288. 26 U.S.C. § 168(k) allows taxpayers to take an additional percentage of bonus depreciation 
in the year an asset is acquired. 
289. 26 U.S.C. § 179 allows taxpayers to immediately expense a large amount of assets that would 
otherwise be gradually depreciable. 
290. 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13201, 131 Stat. 2105 (increasing § 
168(k) bonus depreciation).  
291. Id. § 13101, 131 Stat. at 2101 (increasing § 179 immediate expensing). 
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have a consumption tax.292 Rather, the United States currently uses a hybrid 
system applying immediate or accelerated cost recovery to certain long-
term assets and gradual or delayed cost recovery to others. To give a long-
term investment immediate or accelerated cost recovery is to make that 
investment tax-advantaged and to distort investing toward it.293 Thus, the 
United States has recently distorted investing toward long-term investments 
that are eligible for bonus depreciation and immediate expensing, like 
machinery and equipment.294  
There is—and should be—no similar desire to increase employers’ 
investing in employment noncompetes. Policymakers have clearly 
evidenced a desire to decrease employers’ investing in noncompetes by 
enacting various contract-law-based approaches to curtail their use. As Part 
I detailed, employment noncompetes are currently excessively used to the 
point that they cause significant growth, distributional, and ethical harms. 
Thus, employer investments in noncompetes should not be incentivized. 
Even in an era when tax law increasingly compromises its matching 
principle, it should not compromise—and should begin insisting on—
matching for employment noncompetes. 
G. Properly Reflects the Value of Noncompetes 
This Article began with an analogy to Al Capone. It argues that since 
employers in contract law disputes assert that they adequately compensate 
                                                      
292. See, e.g., Noël B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 
52 TAX L. REV. 17, 20 (1996) (explaining that the difference between a consumption tax and an income 
tax is that “[u]nder the [consumption tax imposed on] cash flow . . . all capital investment is deducted, 
or expensed, when made, while under an income tax, capital investment is recovered through 
depreciation deductions or upon disposition”). 
293. Yale, When Are Capitalization Exceptions Justified?, supra note 273, at 550 (arguing that 
capitalization and economic depreciation are normative or first-best rules for an income tax, meaning 
that deviations should be rare and narrow). 
294. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43432, BONUS DEPRECIATION: 
ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY ISSUES 7 (2014) (“Because expensing applies only to equipment, it 
increases the distortion between tax burdens on equipment and structures.”); GARY GUENTHER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL31852, SECTION 179 AND BONUS DEPRECIATION EXPENSING ALLOWANCES: 
CURRENT LAW, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS, AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 14 (2013) 
(“The Section 179 and bonus depreciation expensing allowances have the potential to distort the 
allocation of resources in an economy by driving a wedge between favored assets and all other assets 
regarding their profitability.”). 
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their employees for being subject to noncompete restrictions, they should 
be bound by this assertion in tax law. They should be required to allocate 
adequate compensation to the noncompete and capitalize and amortize it, 
rather than immediately deduct it. But not every employer is involved in a 
contract dispute, not every employer would necessarily assert that it 
adequately compensates its employees for noncompete restrictions, and 
some might even claim that any compensation they pay for the noncompete 
is a mere peppercorn of consideration. Indeed, at least one study finds that 
employees are paid less when they are subject to a noncompete,295 lending 
support to the possibility that claims of adequate compensation are self-
serving and false. 
If employers are willing to oppose the proposal in this Article by arguing 
that they provide no (or only de minimis) consideration in exchange for an 
employment noncompete agreement, then there is benefit to publicly 
exposing their argument. It reveals the inconsistency between the contract 
law view of employment noncompetes and the tax law view. Further, 
workers who are sued for breach of employment noncompetes should be 
allowed to request discovery and present evidence that, for tax purposes, 
their employers treated their noncompetes as having no value. 
However, even if employers collectively reverse their public position and 
deny that they meaningfully compensate their employees for being subject 
to noncompetes, it does not follow that noncompetes cease to be intangible 
assets with significant future value. Actual value is not conclusively 
established by the self-serving testimony of the purchaser. Moreover, tax 
law sometimes sets aside values that were agreed to by both parties to a 
contract when the agreed-upon value was not the product of informed, 
adversarial bargaining.296 Instead, tax law establishes value based on “the 
price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell 
and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”297 If an employer 
purchased a noncompete agreement from a willing employee who was not 
under compulsion to sell and who had reasonable knowledge of relevant 
                                                      
295. Garmaise, supra note 89, at 401–02, 413 (finding that with regard to executive compensation, 
employment noncompetes may be associated with larger signing bonuses and/or higher initial 
compensation, but they are also associated with smaller raises and lower overall compensation). 
296. Prior to the enactment of § 197, for example, the IRS often challenged values for items like 
goodwill and customer lists that were contractually agreed-upon between business buyers and business 
sellers since business sellers had insufficient incentive to counter business buyers’ desires to allocate as 
much value as possible to intangibles that are recovered quickly. See, e.g., supra note 190 (citing Ill. 
Cereal Mills Inc. v. Comm’r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1001 (1983) (IRS argued that the business sale contract 
allocated too much value to the seller’s covenant not to compete with the buyer)). 
297. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973) (quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b)); 
see also id. (“The willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value is nearly as old as the federal 
income, estate, and gifts taxes themselves . . . .”). 
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facts, the employee would demand adequate compensation. Thus, tax law 
demands adequate allocation of value to employment noncompetes based 
on its own objective definition of fair market value. It does not depend on 
employers’ contract-law-based claims that they adequately compensate 
their employees for being subject to noncompetes. These contract-law-
based claims merely strengthen the argument. 
CONCLUSION 
When an employer obtains a noncompete agreement from its employee, 
it obtains an intangible asset that will benefit the employer primarily after 
the employment relationship ends, and gradually over the restricted period. 
As the employer benefits, both the employee and the public suffer. Thus, it 
is disappointing that, quietly and carelessly, the IRS allows employers to 
take a tax subsidy for subjecting an ever-increasing number of American 
workers to noncompetes. This subsidy occurs when employers immediately 
deduct the full compensation they pay to employees subject to noncompete 
agreements as though that compensation was not even partially associated 
with their acquisition of future benefits. This subsidy should end.  
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